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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This thesis is concerned primarily with an examination and 
assessment of the proposals that are currently employed to promote the 
inclusion of philosophy in precollege education . It is the central 
contention of t he thesis that t he dominant arguments in favour of 
precollege phil osophy are not yet adequatel y formulated . In support of 
the inclusion of philosophy in the school syllabus, therefore, I shall in 
this thesis seek to identify areas of apparent and real weaknesses within 
the framework of the dominant arguments , with an aim to showing how these 
weaknesses mi ght either be ex~irpated or overcome. 
Requisite to the achievement of this comprehensive task is an 
understanding of the term 'philosophy' as iv is used in the context of 
precollege education. To thi s end, Chapter I focuses upon alternative 
conceptions of phi l osophy and the teaching practices to which they give 
rise . Current methods of teaching precollege phil osophy are described, 
and they are t hen examined in terms of this broader conceptual framework. 
Having completed this initial part of the thes i s , I will concentrate 
more determinately upon the arguments surrounding the introduction of 
philosophy in the schools. Chapter II exam:i.nes the main argument which 
presently serves as the primary source of motivation for implementing 
philosophy i n the schools, na.mely t hat the study of philosophy devel ops 
and improves t hink ing skills. Together with the anatomization of t his 
claim , Chapt er II also explores the viability of the claim in terms of 
1 
the teachability and transferability of thinking skills. Finally, I 
shall evaluate the role played by philosophy i ~ the development of 
thinking skills. Two argwnents will be considered in this connection: 
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( i ) that philosophy i s the excl usive vehicle for the development of 
thinking skills - this I deny; and (ii) i f philosophy does not have a 
monopoly on thinking skill development, then does it contribute anything 
unique to cognitive abil i ty? 
In Chapter III three claims made i n favour of philosophy f or 
children whose benefits are putatively a function of studying philosophy 
are considered. Whereas the development of thinking skill s is an 
argument that has been adduced in t he justification of other educational 
innovations, the arguments presented in this chapter which espouse the 
virtues of precollege philosophy are believed to be concerned with 
by-products peculiar only to the study of that discipline. The proposals 
examined here are (i) that philosophy can act as a buffer t o indoctrination ; 
(ii) that philosophy affords a framework in terms of which the curriculum 
can be integrated; and (iii) that philosophy can bring more meaning 
into the lives of those who pursue it. 
Chapter IV then turns to consider the overall viability of 
philosophy as a pursuit suitable for precollege students . Two aspects 
of viability are examined. The first relates to the capability of 
children for the kind of thinking that philosophy requires and, gi ven 
the requisite ability, the second concerns the degree to which they are 
rea~y to confront the issues engendered by phi losophic inquiry . The 
most .pe:::-s i stent challenge to philosophy for children is fostered on the 
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grounds of Jean Pi2.€et's theory of cognitive development. Hi s theory 
can be interpreted s~ as to sustain the objection that children 
younger than 12-14 :.-ears have neither a facility with nor the ability 
for abstract thinki ~;. the mode of thought which is predominantly 
demanded by the st~:.:: of philosophy . Accordingly, Chapter IV is devoted 
to an analysis of t~:s objection, ascertaining the strength of the 
contention in ligh-c :;-;: both the contemporary work in cognitive development 
theory and the emer€e~ce of conceptual frameworks promoting alternative 
explanations for tte jynamics of cognitive growth. The chapter then 
moves on to consider the viability of precollege philosophy in terms of 
~he student's readi~ess to confront issues in philosophy. Very little 
research has been d:;~e in this area. However, there is a line of 
investigation, the ~:~dings of which strongly suggest that most children 
are ready for philo2~?hy. The argument gives rise to two problems namely, 
the assessment of re~iiness, and individual di f ferences in readiness; 
recommendations for ~ieir resolution are provided; 
It is to be ~:;ped that the analysis of precollege philosophy 
presented here will ~~ford the reader a better understanding of the 
nature of the disci;:ine and the concomitant theoretical and practical 
problems in need of resolution. The admission of th~se problems should 
not be taken as an argument for the futility of precollege philosophy 
programs. On the cc:·.-trary, the discussion in this thesis attempts to 
show that the diffic:·..:.:.ties are not insuperable. In respect of more 
recalcitrant proble~ 2, it is to be hoped that the thesis at least 
suggests avenues which might in the future be profitably followed to 
achieve their resolution. 
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C H A P T E R I 
1'HE NATURE OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY 
What is precollege philosophy? What, in other words , is taught in 
the schools under the rubric of precollege philosophy or philosophy for 
children? 
The answer to this question depends primarily upon the conception 
of philosophy within which the philosophy program is embedded. I shall 
begin this thesis , ther efore , by bri nging together three interpretations 
of the nature of philosophy which engender slightly differen~ orientations 
towards its teaching. In the most general sense , the term philosophy 
refers to the love of wisdom, and its etymology clearly bears this out . 
There is also the sense of the term where philosophy refers to a specific 
body of problems and/or the hi story of the i deas of the famous philosophers . 
In either case, the philosopher is one who exhibits a special competence 
wi th the tradit i onal philosophical theories and problems . In more recer.t 
times , the term philosophy has been used to indicate a particular mental 
methodology or analytic habi t of mind . On this latter account philosophy 
has no subject matter of its own; it is rather a meta- discipline which 
affords the elucidation of virtually any problem . 
My aim in this chapter is twofold : first , it 1s to argue that 
the ideal practice of teaching philosophy in the schools requires that 
the philosophy program incorporate components based upon each of these 
three concepti~ns of phi l osophy ; and second , it is to examine the 
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relationship that exists between the current approaches to teaching 
precollege phi.losophy and these three interpretations of philosophy .· 
Accordingl y, this chapter is divided into three sections : 
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(l) a description of three conceptions of philosophy and the 
implications for teaching philosophy to which they give rise. From this 
discussion, a proposal for what mi ght constitute a successful , if not 
ideal, phil osop:1y program is developed; 
( 2) an outline of the methods currently employed in teaching 
precollege philosophy . To better understand these met hods , some of their 
advantages and disadvantages are discussed ; and 
(3) an examination of t he relationship between the conceptions 
of phil osophy discussed in (1) and the teaching methods discussed in (2) . 
Three Conceptions of Philosophy and the Concomitant 
Imulications for Teaching 
Let us beg in with the concept of philosophy as the love of wisdom. 
To determine what , on this view constitutes philosophy it is neces sary 
to examine more closely the nature of wisdom. Thi s involves an 
appreciation of the dist inction between wisdom and knowledge. As 
problematic as . any account of knowledge may be, wisdom implies the ability 
to deal sagac iously with what one knows. This is perhaps more easily 
expressed ~s part of the distinction between knowledge and understandin; . 
For exa1:1ple, one mi~ht kno,, how high Mt. Everest i s , but if in the 
r.iorn i nt; one goes to climb it dressed in a swimsuit and without a packed 
Junch, then l.t is clear that one has not understood what one claims to 
know. Indeed, one would not be described as having behaved wisely . 
Wisdom, to some extent then, may be described as a combination of 
knowledge , an understanding of the knowledge, and an ability to make 
decisions and act in accordance with that understanding . On this view 
then, an educational program which hoped to teach philosophy would need 
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to develop in i ts students an appreciation for what wisdom is , and an 
actual love of what that involves . In order to appreciate more fully the 
nature of this requirement, let us examine more closely what the love of 
wisdom involves. First , an appreciation of what wisdom is, requires that 
the indi vidual be able to detect the difference between learning and 
understanding. 'Ihis conception of philosophy requires that the students 
learn to seek not so much knowledge and facts as an understanding of what 
knowledge is , what facts mean , the way i n which facts feature as knowledge , 
and the use that can be made of them . On this view of philosophy it is 
clear that the teaching of philosophy employs little , if any philosophy , 
at least if philosophy is thought of an sone content or subject- matter , 
say the history of philosophy or the particular problems which it treats . 
This is not to say that an acquaintance with this subject-matter might 
not contribute to the understanding being sought , but rather the point is 
that it might not . In other words, there is no logical reason why one 
should expect philosophy, in the sense of the knowledge of traditional 
problems , and philosophy alone to make a person wise . 
Seconc, the actual love of wisdom requires a love of l earning . 
Indeed, it seer:1s uncontroversial that the l ove of wisdom, no matter what 
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eJ se it might invol ·:e, entails a love of learning. This involves the 
development o: a se:-:se of the excitement of intellectual curiosity and 
discovery and an a:i;;;:::-eciatior; for the uses to which knowledge can be put. 
The generation of t~ese feelings and attitudes is, by and large, a 
result of the way i:: · .• hich lessons are presented. It is not so much the 
content of what is ~aid as in what is shown by what is said . On this 
view of philosophy ~::en, the teaching of philosophy also requires that 
the teacher have ar.i oe able to share a love of the enterprise in which 
he/she is engaged . :tis through that love that they transmit to their 
students the love o: :earning. 
It should noh oe easier to appreciate the scope and limits of the 
second concept of ~~: losophy , that is , philosophy as a body of content or 
subj ect matter . Al~~ough there is an interacti on between the two, the 
subj ect matter refe~:::-ed to here covers two broad areas - the history of 
philosophy or philc:~phical thought and the classical problems of 
philosophy. It ·,,o,...:.:. ::>e misguided to think that a comprehensive 
understanding of p~::.osophy could be reduced merely to t he historical 
account of p~ilosc;~y. The view of philosophy as content admits of a 
less myopic construa:. than the rendering of what this or that philosopher 
has espoused . The ~~~tent of philosophy can be substantive in the sense 
of an appreciation c: the traditional problems of philosophy. 
Certain prob:.~~s have come to be identified as peculiarly 
philosophical proble::-.s, for exa..'!lple, free will and determinis!".l , the 
mind- body relation a::~ personal identity . If one construes philosophy 
a.s a di$cipline cc:.5::i t.uted of such proble!ns and the world- views to which 
they give rises jt would follow that a course in philosophy would need 
to treat these issues. Moreover, one would expect that the better the 
~ature of these problems was presented, then the better would be the 
philosophic education. On this account, it would be expected of a 
philosophy program to present the classical problems of philosophy in 
such a way that the students become familiar with the nature of the 
intellectual de::iands placed upon those who consider them. It is not 
required that t~e program have a high level of sophistication in all 
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areas of philosophy, nor even in one. Indeed, such an expectation is 
seldom, if ever, satisfied even in the case of professional philosophers 
whose specialist area accumulates literature so quickly that their 
absorption reQuires more attention than could be given . Expertise might 
actually serve as an impediment to the teaching of philosophy, in the 
sense that the feeling that all problems have been solved can be 
intellectually debilitating . Nevertheless, there is a strongly based 
presumption in ~avour of the philosophy course containing enough substantial 
information aoout tr.e traditional problems of philosophy to transmit an 
understanding o~ them. The good teacher of philosophy would , on this 
account, educate for philosophical capability in creating an intellectual 
climate in which the student feels capable of making a personal 
contribution. The teacher of philosophy is not so much required to 
cultivate pro~essional philosophers as to nurt ure an appreciation of 
what it is abot:t philosophy that makes philosophy worth professional 
pursuit . In respect of the concept of p~ilosophy as content, students 
need an acq_clai:::.ance with the tradi tiona:i. problems of philosophy to the 
~.xt-ent that 7.~~ey are inspired to pursue the problem ' s res0lution . 
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Now l et us turn to the third concept of philosophy, philosophy 
as a technique of i ntellectual reflection, and determine t he extent to 
which i t demands a curriculum consistent or otherwise with the foregoing. 
Philosophy is often regarded as a reflective habit of mind . Most 
particularly, _ it is rendered as a predisposition to analysis where the 
subj ec t of t he analysis is, by and large , the conceptual f ramework i n 
which t he problen or issue in question l ay. For example, to think 
phi losophically about the problem of abortion entails, on t his view, 
reflection upon and analysis of more global concepts l ike ' the right to 
l ife', 'the ownership of choice', ' the morality of murder' , etc. Whereas 
a scientific discussion focuses upon issues like the probability of an 
outcome (e . g. adoption rate after bir th-of unwanted child) based on 
statistical COTiputation. 
On this view of philosophy, philosophy is deemed to have no 
subject matter of its own, the sphere of influence of the technique 
extending far beyond the traditional problems . Vi rtuall y any problen ca~ 
be treated philosophically, and viewing problems philosophically , incluci~g 
the t raditional problems, in many cases signifies an analysis of t he 
language i n terms of which the problems are themselves formulat ed . On 
this view, philosophy is concerned with making explicit the assumptions 
and implications i mplicit in the questions and answers that philosophers 
and others have been disposed to raise and provide. i~1ile this concept i on 
of phil osophy represents a distinct way of looki ng a t things , it is not 
easy to say or t each what it is that makes it distinc t . There are t,..;o 
t.:1in1:;s , however, "that it seems necessary for the students to be able t o 
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do, First, jnsofar as philosophy rests heavily upon the distinction 
between empirical ~~i conceptual matters, part of what the student needs 
t o know is how to r:-.a:~e t his distinction . Secondly, philosophy here is 
concerned to circur..sc~ibe the domain of possible states of affairs and 
events and, therefc~e, the s tudent must develop the skills appropriate 
to this task. In o:::er words, t he philosophy student needs to know how 
to determine when a~ account of a matter reflects a coherent description 
of events. However , it is not enough for the students merely to be able 
to do this . They ~~st also be able to articulate for others ~hat t hey have 
done, that is, to be able to delineate the features of the matter which 
constitute its coherency . On ·the one hand, the traditional problems of 
philosophy are in t~e~selves of little use in acquiring the skills of 
analysis fami2iar to contemporary philosophy. On the other hand however, 
the so- called tradi~~onal problems do admit of the contemporary approach 
and much recent lite~ature is in this vein. Although a study of the 
traditional problet::s c.oes not i n itself advance the teaching of 
philosophy as a met:-.oc. of analysis and reflecti.on, the application of t he 
contemporary approec~ to the traditional problems does . Hence , it is 
easy to see that the student of philosophy could benefit from exposure 
to the contemporary iialogue . It would afford a familiarity wi th the 
tools of conceptual a~alysis, as well as an opportunity to experience 
the intellectual ir.~e~itance of the past . In -this way , the second and 
third concepts of p:-.i:osophy can be integrated . 
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fl Proposed Model for Teaching Philosophy 
In this section I am concerned to show that the successful , if not 
ideal, practice of teaching philosophy requires components drawn from 
each of these three conceptions of philosophy. In what follows I set out 
to justify this model for teaching philosophy by considering sone of the 
consequences of excluding from a philosophy course those teaching 
practices peculiar to each of the three conceptions of the discipline . 
First, let us consider the effects of a philosophy program that 
fails to generate an appreciation for, and a love of , wisdom . Two 
outcomes are likely . On the one hand , the processes of critical thinking 
and reflection may easily become ends in t hemselves . Sophism is a good 
example here. When students are not taught to use these skills in the 
context of the search for understanding and meaning , they are open to 
acquiring the mindless habit of applying the ski lls in the manner of a 
ritual to all probl ems they confront. While the thinking processes might 
be developed in this way to a high level of excellence , the unthinking 
application of the respective corporate skills defies the ' true' nature 
of the philosophic spiri t . Moreover , t he practice of r itualized 
application closes minds on issues that are fundamentally open . For 
exampl e , it does not allow for the re- a s sessment of thi nking strategies 
in light of the intricacies and nuances of each situation . In other words , 
in the absence of the search for r.ieaning , students may have as their goal 
' skill proficiency ' . This would be unfcrtunate as it serves to curtail 
the actual use _to which thinking processes can be put . 
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On the other ~and, students are unlikely to display much incentive 
to search for the r.-.ean ing contained within the experiences of everyday 
life unless the phi:csophy programs are dedicated to imparting a love of 
knowledge and unders~anding. Within the context of the classroom, any lack 
of incenti ve will nc: be so apparent . However, outside the classroom 
where the motives o~ ?leasing the teacher and passing examinations are no 
longer cogent , stude'-ts are less likely to be concerned with reflection 
and deeper interpre:ations of everyday experience. Imagine , for example , 
Johnny a boy who in t:ie context of the classroom applies his critical 
thinking skills to a passage in his textbook, yet who outside the classroom 
~oes not ' think' to apply the same thinking skills to the discourse of a 
fr iend. While he ca'- ascertain the validity, worth and meaning of his 
textbook , he i~ not a~forded the same opportunity in respect of his friend ' s 
dialogue . It is not that the friend 's discourse does not admit of such 
analysis . The point ~s rather that without the motivation to perform 
reflective analysis, ~ie range of possible meanings that Johnny could 
extract from the inte~action with his fr iend is reduced . 
Programs , the~efore, which do not attempt to generate a love of 
wisdom, by and large, reduce to either thinking skills development or a 
history of intell ect~al thought. In both cases, the scope of the study 
is restricted by vir:~e of undeveloped incentive to the material presented 
in the classroom . :'-sofar as all aspects of our l ives need understanding, 
it seems unreaso~a~:e :o construe the pursuit of wisdom as merely a 
function of inschool e~ucation. Every aspect of our daily 1 i ve s 
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admits of a philosophic interpretation and accordingly, I woul d choose 
to a r gue that any program which failed to encourage the motivation to 
~ursue this type of analysis across a broad spectrum of situations could 
not rightly clai:n to teach philosophy. 
Let us now turn our attention to those philosophy programs which 
exclude the tradit ional subject matter of philosophy, whether it be the 
hi storical study or classical problems of the discipline. Programs which 
generate an understanding of philosophy as certain processes of thinking 
and/or the love of wisdom alone, deny students an appreciation of the 
great tradition of intellectual thought that has come to be known as 
philosophy. Perhaps t he most pernicious feature of this orientation to 
philosophr is the lack of r espect it Dnput es to the interests of key 
concern to prof essional philosophers. This is unfortunate because i t is 
a familiarity with these intractable problems of philosophy that affords 
children an opportunity to reinforce their enthusiasm for confronting the 
perplexities and apparent irresolvable difficulties they fac e in thei r 
everyday lives. In other words, an awareness of the respect that the 
seemingly recalcitrant problems of philosophy engender in professional 
philosophers and others can help students recognize t hat the problems 
1 worth attempting are net only the ones whose solutions are guaranteed. 
Of course anyone familiar with the classi cal philosophic problems 
is aware that the amount of rel evant data that can be accumulated in 
respect of any one problem is almost unending. Therefore , one needs to 
1 See Chapter III of this thesis for a mo1·e detailed account of the 
:issue. 
consider what a:::ou:-:-: ::)f subject-matter is necessary for a program to 
be successful. 
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In most cases the answer to this question depends upon two things : 
the intricacy and i~~~actibility of the philosophic issue under 
consideration; ar.i, ~he prior experi ence with and competency for dealing 
with the philosop~i: :.ssues that the prospective students enjoy . Granted 
that these ~ore spe::.:'ic needs have been met, a requisite condition to be 
met across all sit~a-: ions is the provision of at leas~ that amount of 
subject- matter whic~ ~ould serve to prevent 'philosophic indoctrination' 
or indoctrination i:-:~o a part i cular philosophic vi ewpoint . Instruction 
which fails to cor:-.::·.::.icate accurately the range of opinions concerning a 
particular philoso:;:~:.~ issue or which involves the assertion of 
controversial philcs~?nic views without reasoned consideration of the broadly 
held contending vi:~s , can be indicted for inculcating biased views. Of 
course, there are t~:s e persons who consciously seek to teach in this way 
primarily :'or the :;:·.:r:;:ose of instilling in the young a specific ideology . 
Notwithstanding the seriousness of this malpractice, I wish to draw 
attention here to ~:-::cnscious indoctrination, that is, the inculcation of 
beliefs which occU!·s ~s a result of the teacher ' s ignorance about the 
dynamics of the phi:..:·s:)phic issue at hand . Consider , for example , the 
teacher who comest~ a place in the lesson where the mind- body problem 
arises . 1-iithout a ;-r:.or exposure to the cen· .. ·ies old debate about this 
problem, a ":-eac~1er ·.;:-.::-:i we will assume for t i'1e purposes of the present 
discussion r.clds a. ::-.~-:erialistic position, may react so adversly to any 
account cf dualisr:-. ~=--~t intellectual inferiority is auto~atically 
t1·ansferred to t:,e .::.:a:..ist' s view-point . 
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What all this shows is how insufficient attention to the subject-
matter of philosophy may transmute jn the context of the classroom to 
unintentional indoctrination. Without an understanding of the range and 
subtlety of arguments that accrue in respect of the different philosophic 
viewpoints, a teacher is both closed to and discourages the philosophic 
vitality of his /her students. Teachers and their students, therefore, 
need to be educated in philosophic subject matter to the extent that the 
opportunity for philosophic indoctrination is minimal . 
Finally, what would be the outcome of a philosophy program which 
was not concerned with developing the reflective habit of mind? ~wo 
unfortunate consequences .present themselves. First, without the development 
of the mental skills which afford reasoned criticism, ·a student's role in 
learning is relegated to that of the passive receiver or the receptacle of 
the information that the educational system chooses to communicate. In 
other words, the students are ill-equipped to assess and make meaningful 
the diverse information with which they are bombarded daily both within 
and without the school context. Second , pupils are denied the joy and 
satisfaction that comes about by thinking through issues , philosophical 
and otherwise, when the capacity for reflective and analytic thinkins is 
left underdeveloped . They become more easily frustrated in their love of 
learning and pursuit of truth since the skills which would allow them to 
achieve these ends remain dormant . Without a component designed to 
encourage the reflective habit of mind , a philosophy proGram may amount 
to little more than a description of the different philosc•phical vicwpoint.s . 
Such .a procra:n in itself does not provide the opportu:1i ty to p~1.rtic ipate 
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ju the practice of ; ::ilosophy and the kinds of thinking that, in the first 
place) generated t :~ : .:: e viewpoints. Again, the questj on of bal ance arises; 
that is, how ~uch e::;~asis should a philosophy program place upon 
philosophic subject ::atters and how much upon the development of the 
reflective habit o: ::ind. 
At the 0:..1:se:, it seems uncontroversial that the reflective habit 
of mind shoul d be ::.e-:eloped in students to its fullest potential. The 
g_uestion, therefor e , is probably best addressed by considering the upper 
limits of the practi:e. It would seem desirable to educate f or reflective 
thi nking up to that :;:;oint at which f urther instruction would l i kely r esult 
in motivating tte ~se of thinking ski lls as ends in themsel ves . In other 
words, to disco~age students from becomir.g ' avid little analyzers ' who 
analyze ' every"thing :o death' seems desirable. The love of wisdom 
component of p~i:os: ;~y comes into play here. The love of wisdom can serve 
to temper the pred i 2;~sition t o chronic analycity . It orients the capacity 
for reflective cri~i : is~ so that i t can ~unction as a tool in pursuit of 
meaning, rather tha~ as a single isolated perspective upon reality . 
Socrates reminds us~: the importance of this franework in the fol lowing 
passage : 
Even if we kno~,- :;ow to turn stones into gold , such ~nowledge 
would be wort:-::ess . For i f we did not know how to use gold , 
it would do us ~o good . . . . Even if there were some knowledge 
that would r.:a~e ·.;.s deathless , if we did not know how to use 
our deathlessr.ass , even t hat woul d do us no good . 2 
One aspect c: :eacher performance is very inportant f or developi ne 
reflective th i nkir.[ . ~he teacher must be adept in t he skills he / she i s 
2
socr~tes i~ t ~e : ~:~ydeMus of Flato , 2e5e-289b . 
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attempting to instruct . Let me give an example pertaining to the 
development of critical thinking . Consider a teacher who is not 
proficient in the skills requisite for assessing coherency . Not only 
would he/she be unable to assist students in recognizing incongruities, 
but he/she could not assist in the students ' development of their own 
analytic ski lls. This is unfortunate. The most pernicious feature of 
this lack of. knowledge, however, manifests itself when the teacher is 
unable to correct specious reasoning, particularly sad when the student 
is dedicated to the pursuit of trut h. 
In conclusion then, I wvuld choose to argue that any proposed 
model for teaching philosophy which did not include practices befitting 
each of the three interpretations of philos~phy actually fails to make 
use of the wealth of knowledge that has com~ to be known as philosophy . 
The most unfortunate consequence of the other models is that students 
are denied access to many vital sources of learning and knowledge. I do 
not wish to s~ggest that the exclusion of any one of these components 
from a course ~ill serve necessarily to vitiate any contribution it 
might otherwise make to existing educational practice. The point is 
rather that , in their absence, a course entitled ' philosophy ' cannot 
afford a con~ribution sufficiently comprehensive to do justice to the 
philosophic mode . :,!oreover , a course lacking any one of these three 
dimensions could , consequently , be indicted for misrepresenting the 
nature of the discipline in all its complexity . 
10 ., 
Methods Currently Employed in Teaching 
Precollege Philosophy 
I should now like, within the framework of the foregoing discussion, 
to examine t he current methods employed in teaching precollege philosophy . 
Three different methods of precollege philosophy present themselves for 
consideration: (i) the philosophy program for elementary and middleschool 
children institut ed by Professor Matthew Lipman and his associates; 
(ii) programs attending to the philosophical content of various literary 
works and/or to the philosophical issues already embedded in the existing 
curriculum. These programs on the whole tend to be· the protiucts of 
indi vidual teachers or groups of teachers with special i nterests in 
philosophy; and (iii ) high school philosophy programs which consist 
primarily of logic and the traditional philosophic issues presented in 
an historical context. 
In what f ollows , I shall first describe each of these methods , and 
second, I shall consider their major educat ional advantages and 
disadvantages . This discussion should provide the necessary background 
for the then subsequent determination of the extent to which the programs 
actually exploit the diversity and richness of philosophy by incorporating 
elements from the three dimensions of the discipline presented above . 
I shall begin by considering the third type of program , (iii) 
mentioned above . ~his method of teaching precollege philosophy is basea 
en a very narrow conception of philosophy and it is tr.us a r.:uch less 
i nterest ind proGra~ than the other t~o me~hods . ~Y nnul ysis of it here 
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wiJJ_, therefore, be brief. Together with its description, I will include 
a brief discu~sion of the method 's limitations . 
By and large , the high school philosophy programs consist of the 
didactic presentation of the following : the history of philosophy and/or 
the traditional problems of philosophy; and , logic. This method of 
teaching philosophy treats philosophy as a body of knowledge both 
complete in and of itself wherein students are viewed as the passive 
recipients of that inforr:iation . Educationally, the method fac es two 
major difficulties. First, there are many economic and administrative 
problems brought about by the introduction of a new and separate unit of 
study into the curriculwn. Fur example, there is the problem of suitable 
course instructors, and the problem of accommodating a new subj ect in an 
already overcrowded curriculU!l'l . Second, th~ method does not offer a 
context suitable for introducing phil osophy into ear lier education. For 
example , it makes no provision for bringing the classic problems of 
philosophy to younger childr en in a language that they could understand . 
This method of teaching is neither orientated to the generation of a love 
of wisdom nor to the development of the analytic , reflective habit of 
mind. Accordingly, its students are deprived of a large amount of knowledge 
that is actually the potential outcome of a philosophy course . 
Now let us turn to Professor Lipman's program in precollege 
philosophy, or as it is now widely known , 'the philosophy for childrer:. 
approach '. 
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'I'he program is characterized by the following two basic f eatures . 
(1) Philosophy is presented to children in a language appropriate 
to their age through the medium of the ' philosophical novel ' . These 
novels, written by Professor Lipman and his associates for each age 
group from K- 12th grade, are designed for the specific purpose of 
teaching philosophy to children. Each story centers upon a group of 
children of comparable age to the readers for whom it was written. The 
traditional pro'o:.ens and contemporary issues in philosophy , the rules of 
f ormal and informal logic, and the practices of establishing good reasons 
for belief are introduced at an early age and continue to be developed 
throughout the series.3 By way of the philosophical novel , philosophy is 
presented within the context of events which supposedly typify the real 
events in the lives of the chi ld readers. As a result , everyday life is 
made to serve both as the stimulus to philosophic reasoning and 
speculation , and as the framework in terms of which philosophy itself is 
understood . ~~is serves to develop an appreciation of the extent to whici 
daily life adr.li ts of d·eeper and broader meanings . Indeed, it is likely 
that this feat t:re of Lipman ' s program serves as the single most important 
motivation for its continued implementation . 
Little , if any , attention is given within the novels to i nforminb 
children that they are actually engaged in philosophy . Rather , the 
novels portray tte children as persons who are sensitive to problems anc 
phi l osophic issues ; as persons who seek enthusiastically the increased 
3:-'\n outline c:' t:--.e Phi losophy fer Children curriculun i s .:;iven in 
appendix 1 . 
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depth of understand:~; that the reflective habit of mind can afford . It 
j s intended that t:.-.e :::1ildren in the novels should serve as models for 
the readers; models of persons who are keen to partake in philosophic 
inquiry and proble~-s:)lving. 
(2) The ph:::sophy for children approach emphasizes the importance 
of class discussio~ ~or teaching philosophy. According to Lipman, the 
philosophic novel, :~ and of itself, has little to offer by way of 
educating for phi~cs:;~y . For the latter , Lipman contends that the novel 
needs to be acco~pa~:ed by ongoing class discussions wherein the issues 
and thinking practices outlined in the novels can be brought to life . In 
other words, the nc·:e: is designed to function as the context in terms of 
which philosophical :ssues are introduced and the techniques appropriate 
to their resol~tion a~e modelled. The ensuing class discussion , on the 
other hand, is the ;:ace where philosophy and the skills requisite for 
its practice are a~:,~ally acquired and understood . The development of 
the class discuss:c~, ~herefore, is an integral component. in the philosophy 
for children prog:cc.:-.: . Each novel is accompanied by an Instruction Manual 
for teachers . The =c.~uals provide an extensive coverage of techniques 
useful for facili~a::~g class discussions, especially as they relate to 
the topics treated ~:~:1in the novel . Class discussion is seen as the 
means by which philcs:)phic inquiry proceeds , and for Lipman, it is 
tantamount to the Q"..~:st for meaning . His method of philosophic inquiry 
is characterized by E. set of principles which are formulated as intellectual 
and moral co!~~it~eL:2 . Both the class as a whole and its individual 
r1em1·ers ::::.~st a-:::r::i:::-8::.: :::..:.e t he se colll!:1i tmeots ,,hen parto.kint:; i:1 their cl~:3S 
discussions . 
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The conunitments are as follows : (i) a commitment to the process of 
inquiry itself; (ii) a commitment to the principles of formal logic, 
when attempting to deternu,ne the validity of an argument , reason or 
explanation ; ( iii) a commitment to the principles of informal logic when 
searching for good reasons for belief . These include, for example, a 
commitment to respect the views of others and to search for further 
reasons; and ( iv ) a commitment to the reevaluation of one ' s reasons . 
11lis includes, for example, a reevaluat1on of one ' s belief in light of 
the accumulation of new factual evidence. The desired method of philosophic 
inquiry portrayed here is modelled and discussed by the children in the 
novels , and the Teachers' Manuals provide further recommendations for 
initiating the practice in the classroom. 
Finally, let us consider the second major way, (ii) above, in 
which philosophy is brought into precollege education . Actually , there ~s 
not one characteristic method. Rather, the uniting feature of t hese 
nethods is that they are designed by individual teachers . "::wo approaches 
are available : either, the teacher can design a philosophy program around 
the philosophical issues already embedded in the existing curriculW:l, or , 
he/she can supplement the curriculum with a variety of literary works and 
concentrate on the philosophical issues contained therein . Some may even 
choose to combine these two met hods . Let us examine the first of these 
approaches . The traditional curriculum systeMatically admits of 
philosophical analysis . The philosophic issues to which traditional 
curriculum most often gives rise , however , are epistemolocical ar!d loGical 
in kind . For exa.rnple , t he questicn ' !Iow do you know th:1t ? ' is applicable 
to all bodies of knowledge and it provides a e;ood startin[ point for 
introducing students t o issues in the foundations of knowledge . 
Simi lar ily , questio::2 like ' Why do you believe that? ' , and ' How do you 
know t hat that ' s ri~:-.t? 1 a re pervasive within the curriculum and provide a 
basis for discussir.g l ogic and the use of its tools in the establishment 
of reasons for belie: . 
While the su:iects of the traditional curriculum do occasionally 
engender questions e~i issues more metaphysical and ethical in nature , 
the contexts best s·..:.:. -:ed for analyses of these kinds do not occur 
systematically . These issues, moreover, are not so readily apparent when 
they do occur , particularly to the nonprofessional philosopher untrained 
in the ways of thei~ ietection. In the general absence then of contexts 
suitable for studyi::g metaphysics and ethics, it becomes necessary to 
supplement the curric:aum with the appropriate materials . It is not only 
necessary to enrich -:::e curriculum with materials, metaphysical and ethical 
in nature , but it is also necessary to do so when any of the philosophi cal 
issues which the tea~::er wishes to treat do not occur appropriately , if at 
all, in t).'le context ::; : the existing subjects . Professor Gareth ~:at thews 
has identified chi lc~en ' s literature which treats philosophical i ssues . 
He provides a source l ist of books useful for elementary and middleschool 
philosophy , together Nith a discussion of the philosophical considerat ions 
contained t herein . 4 ':be majority of books selected by Matthews deal with 
4
:-.iatthews has a re ,:-·..:.lar column in the Journal of Phi losophy for Chi ldren 
which he dedicates ~::; a discussion of excerpts from children ' s books which he has found~ ::; be pertinent to the t eaching of philosophy to 
children . ,.\ descr i;:-:i:m of some of t his 1!1aterial is presented in appendix 2 under the headir.::; ' ~ooks and Other :.:aterials Useful f or TeachiniS 
:"'recolle~:e f ni los o_1;:·.::' . 
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metaphysical, ethical and epistemological issues , and his work is a good 
starting point for teachers who wish to develop curricul um in those areas . 
Sundry other materials more suited to high school students have now 
been identified. In general the selection of l iterary works has been 
carried out on the basis of the extent to which a book either models a 
particular philosophic viewpoint, or contains expositions of and debates 
between conflicting philosophic views. High school teachers , unl ike 
elementary and middl eschool teachers, have the advantage of being able 
also to include within their program traditional writings and texts drawn 
_.~T::,r:i t:1e tlisc ipline o:::· philosophy i tsel:', T.ntroduc1:~ry text cooks to 
phi losophy , including logic, are in most cases accessible to the older 
pupil. Two sources provide an excellent selection of resource materials 
suitable for teaching philosophy in the high school. They are the 
publications from the Centre for High School Philosophy, 1968-1974; a nd 
the High School Philosophy Program developed by Ms Anna Merrington . 5 
5The Centre for High School Philosophy was established in 1968 in Chicago. It was responsible for the development of curricula in philosophy for high school and their implementation in a cross section 
of high schools in the Chicago area . Monthly newsletters were printed during this time , and three manuscripts are now available outlining the history , development, structure and success of the progran. Both sources provide a wealth of suggestions and recommendations for high school phi losophy cu~ri culum development and implementat i on . 
Ms A. Merrington is a high school teacher in the Boston area who has for the last three years been teaching philosophy to her students in 
a course entitled ' Philosophy through Literature ' . Her program i s well 
coordinated and the curricula sufficiently detailed so as to afford an 
excellent sample of literary works suitable for presenting a number of philosophic problems to high school pupils . 
A brief description of these materials is presented in appendix 2 . 
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F'or those teachers who wish to concentrate more specifically npon 
the introduction of logic into precollege education, there is no shortage 
of materials in the current literature designed to introduce elementary, 
middle and high school children to and develop their facility with the 
tools of logic and critical thinking. Numerous programs designed to 
teach critical thinking are available and the t eacher can select courses 
appropriate to his/her own students needs; for example, the Edward de 
Bono Lateral Thinking Program, the :nstrumental Enrichment Program, and 
the Strategic Reasoning Program . 6 
Some Advantages and Disadvantages 
of the Current Methods 
Let us f i rst consider some of the more important educational 
advantages and disadvantages of the philosophy for children approach to 
precollege philosophy . The use of the phil osophic novel has two notable 
advantages . First , the author can selectively piece together within a 
context of continuity and in a relatively small space many philosophical 
ideas and problems. Without this, the teacher must either present the 
material by way of lecture , or he/she confronts t he formidable task of 
amassing selecti ons of work which contain selections of the philosophic 
point in question. Second , the philosophic novel is a very convenient 
tool for modelling the behaviours and thinking skills deemed necessary 
for successful philosophic inquiry . The readers are brought face to face 
6T}:lese pros;rams are described more fully in appendix 2 . 
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wi.th individuals wr. ::: like themselves are learning to appreciate the 
purpose of philosop~:c investigation and the techni.ques of the process. 
Although a verbal e:,:position of the philosophic process Illight be possible, 
it would be less li~~ly to engage the attention and understanding of as 
many students . A variety of personalities and thinking styles interacting 
in philosophical discussions are represented in the novels. This not only 
demonstrates the c~~:.ribution that many individuals can make to the 
phj losophic inquir:: ·:·.:.t it also outlines courses of action rr.ost appropriate 
to their participat:~~. 
1:'he second :::a~ .:r advantage of the philosophy for children approach 
is the support that :.he Instructors Manuals lend to the teachers . They 
provide a diverse se~ection of exercises and activities designed to enrich 
the children's exper:ence together with background material sufficient to 
familiarize the teac~ers with the philosophical issues treated in the 
novel. Of course, :~ is expected that the teachers have on some previous 
occasion explored -::-.~se topics in greater depth . The Manuals are designei 
to serve more as a sc~rce of readily accessible materials covering in 
brief the variety c: arguments and points of view pertaining to the issue 
at hand . 
Perhap~ the ~ost worrying disadvantage of the philosophy for 
children program is :.te demand it places upon the school curriculum. As 
a separate unit of 5:.~dy, its inclusion into the school curriculwn, nay 
necessitate the dis:;:::.acer.1ent of an already existing course of study . This 
i~ itself cenerates ~-~erous problems which are at present in ~eed of 
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resolution and to which this thesis is in part concerned . 7 Two questions 
predominate: f irst) can philosophy add something unique and desirable 
~o the already existing curriculum such that its implementation is 
justified?; and secondly) given that it is worthy of inclusion into the 
curriculum, by what criteria should the arbitration between programs 
competing for inclusion be made? These types of problems are 
notoriously difficult to resolve, yet their intractibility should not be 
used t o provide sufficient reason for their being evaded . 
Precollege philosophy programs of the type constructed by 
j_riclividual teachers have a number of advantages over t:1e philosophy f02.· 
children approach . For example, philosophy is no longer restricted to 
being taught as a separate unit of study in the school curriculum, though 
the opportunity to teach philosophy in this way is not pr ohibited by t his 
approach . Individualized programs make possible the assimilation of 
philosophy into the subjects and disciplines of the already existing 
curriculum. The problem of squeezing philosophy into the curriculum ar.d 
of removing another subject from it for its inclusion is circunvented, 
and the opportunity to experience the extent to which philosophy relates 
to and assists in the i ntegration of all disciplines is readily 
available . A second advantage of these precollege philosophy programs 
is the range of teaching styles of which they admit . Precollege philosophy 
is no longer delimited by the prescription for teaching set out by the 
philosophy for children approach . The teaching process is more flexible 
7The proble::i is treated ?r.ore fully in Chapter III . 
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and the teachers can judge for themselves the styl e most befitting the 
philosophic material and the individual abilities of the children. For 
example , some new and more difficult philosophical i ssue might be bett er 
served by a series of expositor y lectures followed by a class discussion, 
whereas an issue, more familiar to the students , might be effectively 
presented in terms of class di scussion alone. It is this flexi bility 
in teaching strategy which individually designed programs afford . 
The :ne <ior disadvantage of phiJ.osophy progra:-:1s of this ~ype is 
that they rely for their inception and successful implementation upon 
teachers who have a somewhat unusual , maybe even rare, blend cf teachi~g 
and philosophical skills. On the one hand, the teacher must be competent 
in his/her own speciality,' whether it be elementary schooling or high 
school mathematics. On the other hand, he/she must possess a knowledge 
of philosophy ~hich is both sufficient to employ the literary works 
e.rnenabl e to teaching philosophy and suffic ient to recognize the elements 
of the curriculu.~ which admit of epistemic , metaphysical or some other 
form of philosophical analysis. Part of what the knowledge of philosophy 
comes to i s an understanding of the process of phi losophic inqui ry . To 
develop in the students a fac i lity with this process such that they could 
explore issues on their own, philosophy teachers would a lso need to have 
an expertise in this area and a capacity to descri be , demonstrate or , 
i n some other way , familiarize students with the requisite techniques 
which advance philosophical understanding. This is a di fficult and 
demanding task, so ::mch so that mo..ny teachers may not atte!:::pt. to ter:.ch 
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the procedure without the assistance of a professional philosopher or 
without a detailed, comprehensive manual providing a step by step 
guideline of techniques. It is here that the philosophy for children 
approach holds an advantage. Not only do the novels contain a model of 
the process for the students, but the Manuals provide the teachers with 
detailed suggestions for undertaking philosophic inquiry in the classroom . 
Unfortunately however , Lipman 's materials are not particularly suitable 
for being used selectively as a teaching device in this area . Being a 
central feature of the program, the model of philosophic inquiry is so 
embedded throughout the entire program that the successful use of the 
program for teaching the process of philosophic inquiry would be 
tantamount to doing the whole program . In other words, it is difficult 
to imagine how the philosophy for children program could be used 
selectively as a model of philosophic inquiry without an injustice being 
done to the complex and delicately balanced nature of the process of 
inquiry itself. 
In conclusion then, it seems that there is a need for the 
development of yet another approach to precollege philosophy. A 
curriculum which could at one and the same time supply both the type of 
teacher assistance which the philosophy for children approach provides, 
and the l i terary richness and flexibility of teaching styles which the 
individually sponsored programs offer would make a significant contribution 
to the current practices of teaching precollege philosophy . The fol lowinG 
f ramework p!·o·-rid.es an outline of one of the ways in which this new 
curricult~'.:1 :::i.:Lt be or::;ani zed. It could , for cx:1mple , be constructed 
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to include: 
(i) an exter.sive list of literary works specifying the philosophic 
topics to whic~ they pertain and thP. lines of relationship between 
them. Ideally, works suitable for different age groups would be 
~art of this ce:ineation, 
(ii) backgroi.::-.i reading, discussions and lists for furt~er reading 
on the differer.~ philosophic problems, together with some general 
guidelines fer ~~e amount of reading useful for the tea~hers of the 
different age groups , 
(iii) a detai:ei account of philosophic inquiry and the procedures 
for establishi"-g a classroom envircrunent capable of sustaining the 
practice, 
and (iv) a variet:: of materials - film strips, lectures, plays or novels 
- designed to :"-crease the children's understanding of the nature of 
philosophi~ in~~iry and the importance of the principles by which it 
abides. 
It is beyond ~~e scope of this thesis to consider the perplexing 
issues related to teacher education and precollege philosophy. In order 
to set my proposed orientation to curriculum development in context, 
however, it is necessary that at least the key feature of the posture it 
assumes to the educa~ion of precollege philosophy teachers be adumbrated . 
I believe t ha~ the precollege philosophy teacher needs both a 
substantial backgro-..~:::i in the subject- matter of philosophy and a prior 
and on~oinb experie!'".:::e with expl oring thP. various philosophic proble::-ts 
through the context of a community of inquiry. The adequate teaching of 
philosophy and the exemplification of its richness seem to de~and these 
~wo qualities as educational prerequisites. Irr espective of how 
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elaborate a teachers manual might be it cannot serve as a substitute for 
struggling first hand with philosophic issues , nor can it function as the 
t eachers sole introduction to philosophical literature . Rather, the 
manuals are best conceived of as refresher courses providing information 
relevant to various philosophic views and suggestions for instituting 
classroom discussion on related activities . The means by which precollege 
philosophy t eachers are to be educated is a problematic issue an:i beyo:1:i 
the scope of this thesis. The extent of the problem is comprehended, 
however~ by recognizing that its resolution demands an arbitration between 
various claims including those based on econ~mics , the interest level 
and relevant education level of the prospective teachers , the availability 
of professional assistance , and the interests of the student population . 
The Relat ionship Between Current Progr ams in 
Precollege Philosophy and the Three 
Conceptions of Philosophy 
Finally , let us now turn to consider the relationship that exists 
between these current methods of teaching precollege philosophy and t~e 
~hree conceptions of philosophy discussed earlier. 
The philosophy for children appr oach represents a serious atte~~p~ 
to conflate into a single cur ric'..llum two key concepti ons of phil0sop:1::, 
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namely, the notion o:' philosophy as a specific body of problems and the 
notion of it as a pa~ticular mental methodology . The curriculum is 
designed primarily ,...-ith a view to developing thinking skills, putatively 
those thinking ski1:s peculiar to the reflective habit of mind . 8 What 
makes this program ~ique , however , is the context in which the thinking 
skills are taught. 
Thinking is ceveloped by way of encouraging the students to struggle 
~rith the tracii :.::.0:12.: ;,::-ot-le:ns of philosophy and these are set :.:1 the 
context of everyday :ife . In other words, students are taught to develop 
t ."ld refine their thinking skills by way of thinking about the classical 
problems of philosop~y. 
This aprroact to teaching precollege philosophy then, rests heavily 
upon two of the pri::-.ary conceptions of philosophy . What provision, however , 
does it make for de,:eloping the love of wisdom? In the book 'Philosophy 
in the Classroo~ 1 Pr~~essor Lipman writes at great length about the 
importance of :-::.eani:::~ to the integrity of' life, and he evokes many 
reasons supporti:::g t~e vatue of studying philosophy in this vein. 9 The 
children ' s novels ar.~ the Teachers' Manuals, however , focus more intently 
upon the develop=ent of thinking skills and the development and 
assessment of reasons for belief. If it were undoubtedly the case that 
clear and .valid thinki:1g and the establishment of sound reasons were the 
sole purveyors of mea:::ing, then the philosophy for children approach could 
8The thinking skil:s referred to here are listed in appendix 3. 
Q /!,latthew Lip;:w.:1, ,\:-.:1 >1. S:1arp, and Frederick S. Oscanyan, Philosouhv in the C:bssro0!:: ( :'::Ea.:.e::..phia : Tenple University Press , 1980) , pp . 3- 11. 
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be considered a co~;~ehensive program for promoting the love of wisdom . 
Jnsofar as the rela:::.onship between reasons for belief and knowledge is 
controversi al, howe·:e~ , and insofar as the relationship between knowledge 
and wi sdom asymmetr:2al, t he love of wisdom is not, as the philosophy 
for childr en approac:: would have it , such a straight forward achievement . 
'l'he development of -:::e love of wisdom, therefore , would seem to require 
more t han this prog~~~ offers. 
?~ograms i:. ; ~ecol lege philosophy designed by indiviQual teachers 
who harbour a specia: interest in philosophy are much more likely , on the 
other hand, to be 2a;able of generating, i~ not , an actual love of wisdom , 
then at least , an ap?~eciation for what that entails . As a result of their 
special int erest ani enthusiasm to initiate philosophy programs in the 
school s, it is not -.:..:-.reasonable to conclude that, these teachers have a 
love of the discipl:.:.e and an understanding of its imports to the life of 
the mind. It is these characteristics which in the context of the 
classroo~ transmute ~ca love of learning and understanding . 
With regard -:c teaching both philosophy as a special body of 
problems and philosc~C-Y as a mental methodlogy, it is the individual 
teachers interests a:.~ abilities which define the scope of the philosophy 
program. The philosophical subject- matter cover ed in a program will be , 
for example , a functio~ of two things . First , it will depend upon the 
t eachers knowledge c: the range of philosophic problems that actually 
exist , and second, i~ ~ill depend upon the philosophic proble~s in which 
he/she is most inte~ested and feels most competent to te~ch . Similarily , 
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the extent to which ~hese programs develop thinking skills and the mental 
apparatus for conce~~ual analysis is also subject to the teacher ' s 
interests and abili::es. In the first place, the teacher needs to be 
aware not only that ~~i s dimension of philosophy exists but that it is 
a worthwhile pursu::. In the second place, the teacher needs to be 
knowledgeable about ~he field and adept in the skills the program itself 
~reclaims to advance. Without the first, the specific aspect of 
philosophy in quest::~ could not be included in the program, and wit~out 
the second, it coul~ :e included but would likely be unsuccessful . In 
other words then, p~ecollege philosophy programs designed by individual 
teachers can only ~~;e to incorporate dimensions from the three conceptions 
of philosophy to the extent that the teacher is aware of their existence 
and has the interest and ability to teach them. 
C H A P T E R I I 
THE DOMINANT ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY : 
AN IMPROVEMENT IN THINKING SKILLS 
At present, the primary mot i vation for precollege philosophy is 
that it will develop and improve the student ' s thinking skills. This 
argument in favour of philosophy for children has received the most 
attention, and in many cases it is the only one which is advanced. 
There are two explanations for the position of priority enjoyed by this 
claim . On the one hand, it relates directly to the almost universal 
concern for the poor reading levels and lack of critical thinking abili ty 
displayed by schoolchildr~n and college freslunen. On the other hand, 
the claim is by its very nature the one most amenable to empirical 
validation . 
My task in this chapter is threefold : First, I will examine mere 
closel y the clai~ that philosophy can enhance thinking skills . Second , 
I will examine the viability of the claim by considering the extent 
to which thinking skills are , on the one hand, teachable, and on the 
other, transferable into different subject areas . Finally , I will 
evaluate the extent to which philosophy ' s contribution to the improvement 
of thinking skills is unique. I shall conclude by arguing that in light 
of the many prog~ams similarily designed to improve thinking skills, it 
is not productive to use this claim a s the dominant argument in favour of 
precollege philosophy . 
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'l'he Nature of the Claim 
Stated most s~ccinctly, the claim is that through the study of 
philosophy childrer.'s thinking skills can be improved. The major 
exponents of this view are Professor Lipman and his associates who have 
worked prodigiously to promote the philosophy for children approach. 
The claim it5elf is straightforward enough. There is an apparent 
confusion in the li:e~ature, however, concerning the thinking skills 
whi.ch are s uppos ei:..:: eff ected. This is indicated by the variety of ways 
in which the clair.: :-.as been stated . Sometimes, for example, the claim has 
0een cast in terms c~ reasoning ability: ' philosophy for children is a 
systematic and co~p:..ete curriculum which fosters the improyement of 
reasoning abiJity . ,- On other occasions it is construed as the development 
of independent thinf.i~g: ' the main purpose of a program in philosophy for 
2 children is to help :iildren learn how to thi nk for themselves '; and at 
other times , it is a~~irmed as the encouragement of reflective thinking, 
' the aim of a thinki"g skills program is not to turn children into 
philosophers or decision-makers, but to help them become more thoughtful , 
more reflective, mo~e considerate, and more reasonable individuals' . 3 
Moreover, the terms 'independent thinking ski lls ', 'reflective thinking 
1Matthew Lipman , ?~ilosophy for Children, Spring 1983 , Pamphlet from Institute for the ),:::e.nc ement of Phi losophy for Children . 
2Matthew Lipmar. , . .:. ::~ M. Sharp , Frederick J . Oscanyan , Philosophy in the Classroom, 2nd ed . 
3 Ibid . , p . 15 . 
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skills', ' critical and creative thinking skills ', and ' reasoning skills ' 
have been used interchangeably , and it is not uncommon to find , for 
~xample, a discussion commencing in terms of ' thinking skills ' and 
concluding in terms of 'reasoning ability' . Both Lipman and Bergen 
have made this mi stake . 4•5 The issue has been confounded further by the 
introduction of the terms ' philosophical thinking ' and ' philosophical 
thinking skills ' . The development of philosophical thinking is espoused 
as R.n aim o:' the philosophy for children curricullL':'1 and it too is used 
inconsistently . ' Philosophical thinking' is construed at times as 
conceptual analysis and the analysis of language , while at other times 
it is used to refer to thinking about the traditional problems of 
philosophy . This type of terminological confusion tends generally to 
indicate the presence of a deeper, underlying -conceptual hiatus. And 
indeed, within the area of precollege philosophy continuing theoretical 
progress now depends upon the delimitation and clarification of the terms 
presented above. With this in mind , I have tried to identify those aspects 
of the ~laim in respect of t hinking skills which provide some sort of 
coherency when they are brought together. Let us now turn then to these 
key features of the claim. 
In general terms the claim that the practice of philosophy improves 
thinking skills admits of anatomization into three rather more specific 
issues . The first is that philosophy affords a unique opportunity for 
4:-ta tthew Lipman , ' Why aren ' t thinking skills being taught? ' , Thinkin.=-t 3(/4) , 1932 , p. 45. 
c;m · ' - ..., ,.. - ·, 1 C · t · l 1'h · · · ; ..L1r-1ot:1y ,, . !)crce:1 , " . _ . ..w~:mo , r1 1co.. 1nK1.ng : A Si.en of the Times', ,\i~::t.lvtic Teac!'linr: 3(2) , 1983 , pp . 31-33 , 
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i nstruction in the improvement of thinking skills; the second, that 
i.t provides the f ramework in terms of which instruction in the subjects 
of mind, thought and thinking styles can occur; and finally , that by 
virtue of the above logical features, it encourages the incl ination 
towards reflective thi nking . 
Let us consider the fi r st of these. The encouragement of thinking 
skills is thought t o be achieved initially by introducing children to 
formal and informal logic and subsequently, by bringing these processes 
to bear upon classroom discussion. The thinking skills which are most 
often discussed in this context are those pertaining to critical analys is , 
for example, classifying, drawing inferences and identifying 
inconsistencies . 6 Phil9s ophy for children is based on the assumption 
that discussion skills ·are the foundations of thinking skills. 7 By 
assimilating the procedure of a well-constituted philosophic discussion 
the argument is that children concornmitently enhance their capacity for 
clear and correct thinking . In other words; by utilizi ng the logical 
structures implicit in ordinar y discourse philosophy for children is 
believed to instruct children in the art of mental hygiene . And this is 
supposedly the uniqueness of philosophy ' s contribution to thinking skills ; 
a contribution t hat the traditional subjects alone cannot afford . 
Lipman contends t hat traditional schooling fails either to explain 
directly to children what is meant by ' good thinking ' or to cultivate 
6A list of the thinking skills which the philosophy f or children program is aimed to develop is given in appendix 4. 
'7 
11,1atthew Li.pman, P'l-i iloGophy in the Classroom , p . 22 . 
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those practices whereby it may be achieved. 8 Moreover, he contends 
that while the traditional subject areas like maths, science and 
reading may contribute to good reasoning, they are not in themselves 
sufficient to generate it . The suggestion is that in mathematics where 
reasoning is highly abstract and often content-specific, there is no 
guarantee of transferability of reasoning skills to the verbal conceptual 
mode. Similarily, in the sciences where ouch emphasis is placed upon 
inference~ st:::ess is given to inductive in::'erence, leaving the more 
rigorous deductive inference relatively untouched. 9 Lipman ' s second 
invective against the traditional cl aim is that children are not 
specifically encouraged to reflect upon the type of thinking, or logical 
form of thought, appropriate to the er.ter:prise in whfch they are engaged. 
In other words, an explicit account of the various forms of thinking, of 
their roles and legitimate application , is not overtly developed in these 
subjects . It is not as if he wants to deny that the brighter children 
can independently synthesize an understanding of the relevant thought 
processes. His point is rather that a better understanding of the scope 
and limits of reasoning can be brought to all children by virtue of the 
type of curriculum intervention he is proposing . In respect of reading 
instruction, he argues that it has become an end in itsel f where the 
thinking process it was intended t o encourage assur.:e a role of 
lesser i mportance . In other words, instead of reading being used as a 
tool to develop further, the child ' s t~inking processes and h is/her body 
8Matthew Lip~:~n, ' Philosophy for Children ' , '.V!etaphilosophy '( ( 1) , 
:'..~76, p.18 . 
9Ibid ., p . 19 . 
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of knowledge, good reading defined by verbal performance has become the 
educational objective . Lipman cases the interdependence between thinking 
and reading differently. He proposes that an improvement in reading 
improves concomitantly with an improvement in thinking ability . He 
suggests that, in learning how to reason, children learn to grasp the . 
meanings of words and phrases in their relevant contexts thereby ensuring 
that the connotations, suggestions and other sorts of hidden meanings 
C;ontaj nea within co:cununications a.re made more access ible •10 Sponsored on 
the assumption that we read to get meanings, he concludes that philosophy 
tn the schools would serve greatly to make reading a 1:i.ore r:1ear.ingf11l 
exercise. 
The second key poirit to the claim that philosophy improves thinking 
skills is that it also provides a framework suitable for teaching about 
the mind and thought. The suggestion is that the philosophical discussion 
familiarizes children with virtually all aspects of thinking, that is, 
with the sundry capacities of mind and the variety of styles of thought 
which derive from it·. A properly conducted philosophical discussion 
affords its participants an opportunity to observe the ways of thinking 
adopted by the other participants. In this way chil dren thus come t o 
appreciate the variety of ways in which it is possible to think about 
an issue . They learn to appreciate that other thinking styles can elicit 
proposals as · valid and as appropriate as their own. The important point 
here is that exposure to a variety of thought modes puts one's own thought 
in perspective, which itself in turn develops healthy attitudes towards 
10Ib.d l 1 , 
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thinking. Without this, ill- founded beliefs about the less common styles 
of thought are :nore readily formulated, and children with unusual insights , 
for example, are less likely to be discouragen. An awareness of variety 
in thinking strategies, moreover, is thought to be valuable for enhancing 
children's thinking ~epertoires. Some situations, for example , require 
strict fornal thoug~t, others require insight and speculation , others 
involve memory and questioning, while others involve nonlogical and 
creative processes. Inasmuch as different situations are better served 
'oy dif f'eren"t ti::.r_{.::.::~ strategies the claim is that a familiarity wi t:i 
philosophic discl!ss :.on should facilitate the selection of the 'best 
thinking strategy . 
The final pcint related to the claim that philosophy improves 
thinking abil5 ty nc~, pr esents itself . The argument in this case is based 
on the clai m that ;~ilosophy , by virtue of its longheld and persistent 
inquiries i nto the r.ature of thought and mind provides an abundant source 
of ~aterial su~~ao:e ~or enriching children ' s understandi ng in this area . 
Lipman contends that by discussing this component of phil osophic subject-
matter in a philosop~ically standardized discussion, students are 
afforded the opport·..:.!".ity to experience what it is to think about thinking , 
what it is, that is, to turn their thoughts to a consideration of the 
thinking process itself. By exploring the nature of thought and by 
observing in the~se:ves and i n others the aspects of thought and mind 
being discuss ed , t l: e proposal is that children acquire both an understsndinG 
of the traditional co~cepts formulated about mind and a capacity for 
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In conclusio~ then, philosophy is believed to promote good thinking 
skills and a deeper.ed understanding of the nature of thinking and thought 
itself. These qualiti es supposedly form a sound basis for the 
development of effecti ve , independent thinking strategies and t he 
reflective habit o~ ~ind. Instead of being encouraged merely to acquire 
significant re~lect~cns by trying to think someone else ' s thoughts , 
children are - on t~is view - encouraged to develop and express their 
nwn ideas. 
The Viability of tte Claim 
The time has now come to consider two controversial issues which 
are closely tied to the claim that programs in philosophy can significantly 
improve thinking skills . Both issues , namely the teachability and 
t r ansferability of thi nking ski lls , demand exami nat i on in this context 
since t heir validi t:: effect s the immediate viabi lity of t he more general 
argument in favour ~f philosophy for children . 
Before col!lI:le~cing this task , however , a little more still remains 
to be said about the term ' thinki ng skills '. The confusion as to whether 
the ter m means logical, anal ytic , creative or r eflective thinking was 
discus sed i n t he foregoing di scussion . The discussion her e transcends 
this issue , and I a::: now concerned to desc r ibe t wo br oader conceptions of 
t:iat term. 
Whether refe~ring to ' logical thinking ' or 'reflective thinking ' , 
the proponents of r"ecollege philosophy c~aracterize thinkinc skills as 
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techniques t o be taught and developed through the medium of some 
particular subject-matter. By and large , the nature and dynami cs of the 
skills themselves are not ~aught. That is, metaconc eptual awar enes s is 
not developed directly. Rather , skills are learnt s olely by exerc i sing 
them within the boundaries of specific content materials . An alternat i ve 
approach is to view thinking skills as metaconceptual knowledge . On this 
account, thinking skills are developed through: (1) an explanation of 
the strPcture e.na app:..ice.tion o:' skiJ ls ; and ( 2) tre practice of 
actually applying them to different materials. Eere improvement in 
thinking is not so much dependent upon exercising the skill as it is upon 
acquiring knowledge about what the skill actually is and knowledge about the 
range and means of its application. 
The implications for the transfer ability of thinking ski lls which 
these two approaches engender serve as their key dist i nguishing feature . 
On the first ace.cunt , the transferability of ~hinking skills is a somewhat 
haphazard affair. Children are not instructed specifi cally in the 
processes of transfer. Rather the success of this process depends, fo r 
example upon things like a high degree of similarity between situations 
and the student ' s ability to detect this . On the second account , however , 
the transferability of skills i s a l arge component of the metaconceptual 
knowledge that children acquire. Accordingly , the identification of 
situations suitable for transfer is made easier, and the process itself 
made more systematic . 
With these two conceptions of thinking skills in mind , let us 
return now to consider in more detail issues pertaining to the 
_teachability and transferability of thinking skills. 
The Teachability of Thinking Skills 
It is clear that unless thinking can be shown to admit of 
instruction, then the clai.m that philosophy can improve thinking skills 
j f; ·;ac;.1ous . ?':1e extent to which thl.nking is deemed. to be teachable 
depends upon the underlying conception of cognition f rom which it 
derives . :hree possible concept ions of cognition present themselves -
cognitive devel opment brought about by : ( i) the natural processes of 
biological maturation; (ii) the individual's interaction with his 
environment; and (i ii) some combination of (i) and ( ii). Position (i) 
does not yield the processes of thinking teachable . On this v iew, 
cognitive development depends entirely upon changes in physiology brought 
about by the inbuilt processes of b iological maturation . The t heoretical 
postures described in (ii) and (iiiL however, suggest that instruction 
in thinking skills is far from being a futile exercise . On view (ii ) , 
for instance, cognitive development can be brought about only t hrough 
learning , and the conjunction of ( ii) and (iii) would presuppose the 
truth of (iii) . On these two latter views , that is, cognitive developt!ent 
is guaranteed , at least partially , by learni.:-: This being so , we can 
see that t he subs~antiation of the claim that philosophy i mproves 
thinking skills wil l depend upon the extent to which the supportinG 
ar.;;wnents in (ii) and (iii) can be sufficiently elabc;,rated to articulate 
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a theory of learning to think. Some research has been done in this vein, 
and indeed, there is now an accumulation of persuasive evidence attesting 
to the teachability of thinking skills . 11 , 12 The evidence , however, 
tends largely to demonstrate the teachability of thinking skill s in 
terms of the acquisition of metacognitive knowledge . David Perkins , 
for e~ample, has shown that metacognitive strategies like the search for 
counterfactuals, the hunt for alternative causes of an effect, and the 
search for causal chains leading from the same initial situation to the 
same or contrary consequent all admit of instruction. Susan Carey , on 
t he other hand, addresses t he problem of the teachability of thinking 
skills differently. Rather than cite particular examples which 
denonstrate the teachability of thinking skills , either content- specific 
or metaconceptual in nature, she chooses to reinterpret the traditional 
findings , in terms of metacognitive acquisition . What is important 
here is that both these lines of research suggest that , when construed 
as metaconceptual knowledge , thinking skil ls admit of successful 
instruction . 
The Transferability of Thinking Skills 
Let us turn now to consider some of the issues relevant to the 
transferability of thinking skills. Two aspects of the controversy 
11
susan Carey , ' Are Children Fundamentally Different Kinds of Thinkers 
and Learners than Adults? ', In Chipman , S . , Segal , J . and Glaser , R., 
Thinkin~ and Learning Skills Vol . 2 . (Cambridge : Er l ball!ll Associates , 
forthco:!lin5) , p:p. 7- 16 . 
12David Pcrk i r.s , R. Allen and J . Ha fner, ' Difficulties in Everyday 
neasoni1:s ', Ir, :,: . :.:~1xwell ( ed) , Thinkin,-: : ':,.he ~r ontier :::x::-~!:<ls , (Philadel phia : '!ne Frankl in Institute Pr ess , f orthco'.ni n.;) , pp . 11- 13 . 
deserve e l ucidatior. here : (i) the theoretical debate, and (ii) the 
empirical evidence a.~asse.d in support of the claim. The issue of 
transferability is i~portant to the claim that philosophy can enhance 
thinking skills. :tis important since the claim would have little to 
recommend it if t~e thinking skills philosophy supposedly engendered 
were either not ab::.e to be used in any other situation or restricted in 
their sphere of in::~ence t o situations similar in type to those where 
lhey were firs~ acq~i~ed. 
Let us begin our analysis of transferabil i ty then by examining 
the relevant tteo~e~ical debate . Philosophy putatively gives rise to 
thinking skills broader than the reasoning skills of formal and informal 
logic. Most discussion about thinking skills in the philosophy for 
children literatur e, however, is confined to reasoning ability and critical 
thinking. This is a s~gnificant stricture, and the current debate 
concerning the tra,.s:erability of thinking skills, a debate stimulated 
primarily by the Ko~·::. of John Mc Peck , is centred around it . 14 In the 
broadest sense, critical thinking has been understood as a set of 
gener al thinking skills that can be developed through continued practice 
and whic~ have the capacit y to improve ' everyday ' reasoning . The dominant 
works i:. :~e field - Ennis , Blair, Scrivan and Beardsley. - attest to this 
view. 15 Thus construed , the motivation for the inclusion of general 
reasoning skills into the school curriculum is obvious . That is , it has 
14 John E. ;:'.cPeck, : ritical Thinkini;.!; and Education , tNew York : St . Martin ' s Press, 192: ) , p . 39. 
1 5Ib. . ~9 
.1.,1c1., }'.) . .) . 
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generally been believed that general reasoning skills afford a uniform 
tool for performing c r itical analysis in any discipline. In other words , 
the main motivation for the inc lusion of reasoning skills programs in 
the schools has been sponsored on the assumption t hat general thinking 
skills are transferable across disciplines to situations different from 
those in which they were acquired . John l·icPeck , in his book ' Critical 
Thinking and Education ' makes perhaps the first serious attempt to 
c:ontest this claim about t.he transferc.bil:::~y of tht;1k i ng skills. iie 
suggests also that the tradit ional , unexamined view of transfer ability 
promises the rather opaque hope of a shor~ cut to intellectual profici ency 
in a diverse r ange o~ subjects. His argument against t he transferability 
of thinking skills rests primarily upon two criticisms . The first concerns 
the t ransfer power of general thinking skills. He contends that while 
, .. 1e nctio:: of e:-::::z:..is-.:::.ve -::rans:;.'e:' po·.,·e~ ':J:~ ger,era: t:1i nking s"'il.:..s 
represents a s trength of the traditional approach, it also constitutes 
its greatest weakness . According to McPeck, universal generalizability 
is a sign of vacuity, r ather like the way in which a tautology ' s 
consistency with every state of affairs ensures that it is empirically 
uninformative . His second attack upon the transferability of general 
thinking skills , namely that general thinking skills simply cannot be 
transferred is based upon the work of Stephan Toulmin. According to 
McPeck, Toulmin argues that different disciplines function through 
di fferent logics . ~le Peck then proposes his ' somewhat "weaker " view ' , 
that is, that each field or discipline has its own epistemology which 
itself prohibi t :; the t~·ansfer of thinkir.g skills from one domain to 
another. In the absence of a direct statement about the transferability 
of logic one is left to conclude that McPeck is decidedly sympathetic 
with Toulmin ' s alleged characterization of logic as being not transferable 
from one domain of knowledge to another . On this latter point, one can 
only await a clearer statement from McPeck . What is clear is McPeck ' s 
view that the type of thinking which contributes to an understanding of 
any spec i fic domai n of knowledge is a unique function of the discipline 
from which that knowledge derives . In other words) for McPeck there is 
no possi ble style of t hinki ng const i tutive of general reasoning ability 
which might renter succ essful epistemic investigations within different 
disciplines. On this view, there are no such thi ngs a s general reasoning 
skills which can be success~uJ..ly employed in the problem- solving tasks 
or the processes of knowledge acquisition typical of the different 
d:.sc::..plines . 
While :-1cPeck ' s contribution to the transferability debate is 
engaging and deserves further analyses, there are two considerations which 
serve to temper his somewhat extreme view of this issue . The first relates 
to McPeck ' s own interpretation of Toulmin ' s thesis in respect of the 
transferability of logical thinking . McPeck would have it that Toulmin 
denies the transfer ability of logical skills from one subject- matter area 
to another. Admi ttedly , situations have been adduced wher e particular 
rules of logic cannot be generalized for the whole of language; the rule 
of the excluded middle in quantim mechanics being a case in point . 
Nonetheless , it is hard to believe that this is what Toulmin had in mind 
in hi s discourse on ' dif ferent lor,ics for each discipline '. :n light of 
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the extent to whicr. the rules of logic - propositional, modal , and 
ontological - £§!:.!l ce applied meaningfully to many domains of knowledge, 
it seems unreasonac:e to interpret Toulmin as inveighing against the 
usefulness of the tasic laws of logic in a variety of subject- matter 
areas, most partict:..:.arly in respect of epistemic analyses . On the 
contrary, it seems ~ore reasonable to interpret Toulmin 's use of ' logic' 
as referring largely to what is usually meant by the term ' epistemology ' . 
Consequently, one :::: ~it argue that ~.lc Peck ' s argument is based upon a 
uomewhat s!)ecio:.1s :::.-~ erp:ret:ation o:' 'l'oU::..~in' s thes is. '!'his ir. its el f 
tempers the credit:::~y of his own clai~ that genera~ thinking skills 
are not transferabl e . 
The second c~~sideration which s erves to mitigate the force of 
McPeck 's argument c~::cerns the conception of ' thinking skills ' in which 
'-:cPeck is <; O~~~':_::.. :ted pril".l.arily to 
acccunt of thinking skills described earlier , the view,that is , which 
fails to acknowlec.ge a metaconceptual interpretation of thinking. 
Metacognitive skills can be viewed as general thinking skills and, as 
such , must be regarted as thinking skills relevant to the transferabi lity 
debate . Unfortunate:y , McPeck fails to consider this . Susan Carey has 
shown how met.acogni-:ive skills admit of instruction16 and a cogent 
argument in favour o :' their transferability has been advanced by David 
Perkins .17 Perkins , :'or example, has shown how the metacognitive 
16
susan Carey , ' _.'.,re Children Fundamentally Different Kinds of Thinkers 
and Learners'? ' , pp . 2'... - 28 . 
17David Perkins , •::.fficu.lties in Everyds.y 'Seasoning ' , pp . 11- 13 , 
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strategies like the search for counterfactuals and the hunt . for 
alternative causes of an effect can a l l be used to improve everyday 
reasoning and the r easoning appropriate to the elucidation of knowledge 
in many disciplines. The argument in favour of the transferability of 
thinking skills then i s that the use of metacognitive questions such a s 
those suggested above together with questions that help direct · 
epistemological inquiry such as ' Why not?', ' What if .. . ? ' , and ' How do 
you know that ... ?', would serve greatly to establish a comprehensive and 
thorough critique of an issue independent of the discipline within which 
it occurs . 
Having provided a theoretical framework which adequatel y 
accommodates both the teachability and transferability of t hinking skills, 
let us now turn our attention to the empirica l f i ndings adduc ed in support 
ot ~be claim t~at philosop~y i~proves ~hi~~ing skills which can be ~sed in 
a variety of disciplines . It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
provide a detailed analysis of all the empirical research on 
transferability i n the philosophy for children literature . Rather, my 
primary goal here is that the pre sent discuss i on should provide an outline 
of the issues which such an analysis must consider if it is to render 
legitimate conclusions in respect of transferability . 
The first i ssue which needs to be clarified when the research on 
transfer is examined, is the specific degree of transfer i n question . 
Two levels of transfer present themselves for consideration : (i) near 
transfer , whic~ refers to appl ications of the thinking skill to 
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situations that are l ike the original learning situation in many 
important regards; and (ii) remote transfer, where the learner has to 
extend the skill to acconunodate a new task where no clear relationship 
between the original learning situation and the new task is evident . 18 
Empirical investigation in the philosophy for children literat ure to 
date has focused upon 'remote transfer'. In particular, the concern 
has been to s how that the improved thinking skills which come about 
~hrou.gh the study of phil osophy manif est t:1emsel ves as improvements in 
reading~ mathematics, and english. The research findings, however, are 
not unequivocal. Some st udies, for exampl e , report t he transfer of 
skil ls to these subjects19 , 20 , 21 whereas others fail to establish the 
1 t . h ' 22,23,24 same re a ions ips . The situation is further confounded by poor 
r esearch reporting. A variety of crucial variables, i ncl uding rigorous 
statisticai :-:!ethociclogy ar,:;;;ear i.:o have ·.::.een o·;erlooked =-~ :-::an:,.· c: t~,e~;:: 
studies. One can only hope that the absence of such features in the 
18Bryce B. Hudgins , Learning and Thinking, (Illinois: Peacock 
Publishers, :l-977) , pp .142- 143. 
19Matthew Lipman, ' A State Evaluation of a Philosophy for Children 
Program', Thinking 2(1), 1980, p.32. 
20 Mary I . Yeazell, 'A Report on the First Year of the Upshur County, 
West Virginia, Philosophy for Children Project ', Thinking 3(1), 1981, 
pp . 12-14 . 
21nolly Cinquino, ' An Evaluation of a Philosophy Program with 5th and 
6th Grade Academically Talented Students' , Thinking 2(3 / 4) , 1980 , pp .79- 83 . 
22
william R . Hi ga , ' Philosophy f or Chil dren in Hawaii : A Q1.1a nt it:1ti\"e 
Evaluation ', Thi nking 2(1 ) , 1980, pp . 21- 31 . 
23 . ~ Linda r . Annis and David B. Annis, ' The IMpact of Phi losophy on 
Childr0n ' s Cr j tic al Tl:inkinG Al~il i t y ', Conte!-rpor a r v Educ:1ti0r12.l 
T-" .~vcholo,-:y 4(3 ), 197? . pp . 219- ::?26 . 
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published reports is ::1or e a result of incompetent report writing than it 
is a neglect for tte actual practice of carrying out rigorous experimental 
procedure. In lig~~ ·of these research inadequacies, whether they are 
real or apparent, s·.:."::>stanti ve claims about the transferability of 
thinking skills are i:fficult to make. Progress i n t his field is dependent 
then upon the extri:ation of these inadequacies together with the 
:investigators tr.er.:se.:.·.-es developing both a greater respect for the 
findings. '.:'r.e s::.gc. ::~:cant effects upon reading , mathematics and mental 
t · t 24 , 25, 26 · · h"l h f h "ld h b h t h ~a ur1 y w~::~ p 1 osop y or c i ren as een sown o ave, 
is encouraging and ~.-:::ithy of the type of pursuit s uggested here . 
The fin~ings :c. respect of near transfer are much ~ore consistent, 
on tests designed tc :::easure rea soning ability. 27, 28 , 29 The basic 
instr ument used to e·:e.luate the success of the phi losophy for children 
progr am in tea chir.~ ~~inking skills is a critical thinking test developed 
24Mary I. Yeazell , 'West Virginia Philosophy Project ', pp .12- 14 . 
25Dolly Cinquino , ' :::valuation of Philosophy Program ', pp . 79- 83. 
26Matthew Lipman , ' ?hilosophy for Children Program Improves Student ' s Basic Skills ', r:ASS: 3ulletin February , 1979 . 
27virginia C. Sh:;=.an, ' Evaluation of the Philosophy for Children Progr am in Bethlehe~, ?ennsylvania ', Thinking 4(1), 1983 , pp . 37- 40 . 
28 Ronald Reed anc ~:len Henderson , ' Analytic Thinking fo r Chi ldren in Fort Worth Ele::1enta~~- Schools ', Thinking 3(2) , 1981, pp.27- 29 . 
29Dolly Cinquino, 1:::-.raluation of a Philosophy Pro£5ram 1 , pp . 79-83 , 
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by the Educational Testing Service at Princeton in conjunction with 
Professor Lipman. The latest test assesses student ' s proficiency on some 
twenty definable thinki ng skills including: syllogism , induction , and 
ambiguity; as well as the less formal skills such a s the use of aut horit y 
in reasoning , and jwnping to conclusions . The thinking skill s tested 
here are in fact the thinking skills that the philosophy for children 
approach spec ifically sets out to teach. The positive findings, 
therefore, attest to little other than the success of the program in 
t eaching those particular reasoning skills it set out to teach . I do not 
wish here to underr.iine the i!:!portance of this !'inding . Rather , I want to 
make a caution against concluding that phi losophy for children improves 
'reasoning abilit y ', where that t erm is either left global and 
unspecified , or where it includes skills other than those tested by the 
students in t he philosophy for children program has been tested by other 
30 measures, inconsistent results have been found. Certainly , the extent 
of reasoning ability of these students needs much further investigation . 
Given that ther e is a theoretical framework capable of 
accommodating not i ons of transfer , and given that there are positive 
findings in respect of both the near and remote transfer of thinking 
skills, one might reasonably anticipate the transfer of some thinking 
skills after studying philosophy . However , the research to date is not 
yet sophisticated enough in design to formulate definite conclusions in 
this ret;ard . 
30,,.1- . -·. 
,~ 1 .i.131:: 111 Grt , ' Phi1.o.sophy in !"i:1wo.ii ' , pp . 21- 31. 
The Cont~:bution Made by Philosophy to the Development 
of Thinking Skills 
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As intimate~ earlier, the prime motivation for introducing 
philosophy into the schools is that it develops and improves thinking 
skills. In light c : the wide curr ency that this claim has come to enjoy , 
two issues deserve closer examination: (i) the extent to which philosophy 
can actually be cor.sidered the sole purveyor of thinking skills; and 
' ·. :') ~ · _:;t, '2£=<:- -:.::= t t:· is Y·o] e :for phi: osophy is fcund to ·:e 1..:.nterl~'c:..e, 
the extent to whic:: :philosophy can actually contribute something unique 
and desirable ~o ~:::::king skills development . 
The claim t::at philosophy improves thinking skills has its genesis 
in the philosophy :er children l iterature where it is generally explicated 
in ter~s t~at c~s~ :-: as the sole purveyor of thinking skills . Construed 
in this war, fr.e c:.a::n stands in need of emeno.ation , and I sha.:..1 in what 
follows endeavour -=~ show why . 
In a recent edition of the New York Ti mes, t he educational supplement 
featured articles ~::::ch addressed both the need for thinking skills 
development in the schools and the practices currently employed to achieve 
this end . 31 Philosophy for children was but one of the many methods 
identified. A nur:::er of thinking skills programs currently being used in 
education both at ~::e college and precollege level were described. The 
Structu2:e o: tr.e :::::-=llect, the Strategic Reasoning, the Instru:::ental 
3lEd t · S - t N Y k T' 9 J uca 10n up;_e:::en , ew or. imes, anuary 1983 , sec. 12 . 
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Enrichment and the Lateral Thinking Programs were given as examples of 
major commercial approaches, whereas the critical thinking courses at 
~arymount Manhattan College, Xavier University, LaGuardia Community 
College and Hunter College Elementary School were included to indicate 
the range of different approaches that individual schools have taken to 
teaching thinking. The importance of these programs and the consequent 
position of priority that thinking ski lls development has come to assume 
:in educational practice was c l early portrayed. For example, Hunter 
College Elementary School 'has signalled its recognition of the importance 
of such skills by including on the report card to parents a section ~a t ing 
thinking skills. ~:larks are given for critical, creative and logical 
thinking . ' 32 
The article clearly reveals that the development of thinking 
G. ~. as a n~j or educat ional 
and that a variety of programs in service of this end have been developed 
and successfull y instituted in the schools . The implication for philosophy 
and thinking skills development then is that it is simply no longer 
realistic to aggrandize philosophy instruction as the sole, or even the 
dominant, method for developing thinking skills . And indeed , the New 
York Times article characterized philosophy for children as the traditional 
approach to teaching thinking skills - 'working out of a more traditional 
!:1ode, a gr owini; m...::!"::- e1· of schools, e specially in i·!ew Jersey , are us i::..: 
philosophy as the vehicle for teaching thinking skills. •33 It is clear 
32Ibid . , p.37. 
33Ibid. 
that if philosophy ' s inclusion into the school curriculwn conti nues on 
the basis of the thinki ng ski lls argument alone, then i t will have to 
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vie evermore strenuously wi t h the increasing nwnber of compet i ng programs 
bei ng developed in thi s area. Its success here will depend upon there 
being devel oped a cogent argument i n favour of philosophy which 
emphasizes its unique contribution to thinking skills . 
Let us turn now then to examine of what this unique contribution 
might consist. Philosophy's uniqueness needs to be formulated i n terms of 
the development of philosophical thinking skills . For,in view of the wide 
range of thinking skills - critical , creative, logical , etc t~at the 
other thinking skills programs purport to teach , it is di fficult to 
formulate an argwnent for the uniqueness of philosophy in these terms . 
Moreover, it would not be easy to construct an argument showing that 
p:1i:..osopt:;f co1.;.::..d i:~.pr0°re on "t:1ese o~her r.:e"thods . :nere is, -:::at :.s 1:.:::: 
say, no l ogical reason why the tool s of formal and informal logic , any 
~ore than the learning which takes place within a conununity of inquiry, 
need be viewed as a peculiarly philosophic enterprise . Moreover , the 
use of these techniques in non- philosophical thinking skills programs 
does not characterize those progra.~s as philosophical. 
Let us c onsider, therefore , t he nature of philosophic thinking 
$kills . T!le te!.':!ls ' pnilosophical t hinking ' and ' philosophical t h ::. nld:c.-
skills ' are not yet well explicated in the literature . HOi,ever , sor.ie 
interesting work has begun in this area . 34 Professor Jack Zevin ' s article , 
34J k. r , ac · ..,ev1n , 
Social Studies 
' ThinkinG Critic ally, Thinkinc Philosophically ', ]ov. / Dec . , 1978 , pp . 265- 272, 
The 
.. 
• 4 .... 
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'Thinking Critical:.::, Thinking Philosophically ' perhaps represents the 
first serious atte~; t to define philosophical thinking by clarifying 
the distinction be-::,.-~en it and cr itical thinking. Although Zevin fails 
to provide a de:~in::::ive definition in respect of either t erm, his a r ticle 
suggests that crit:~al thinking is concerned more with the correct , or 
most valid, reso:~~: ~;1 of a given problem, whereas philosophical thinking 
is concerned more ¥:t h the meani ng of the problem in terms of both its 
origi ns and co~seQ~e~ ces. His cont ention is that ' criticalness i ncludes 
significant groN-t~ ::i awareness and sensitivity to problems and views , 
as we:: as a c.ee;e~::·.~ understanding of al-;:;ernati ves and cons equences 
available to solve a. given problem or resolve a particular issue ', 
whereas , ' philosopr.~- encourages us to probe motives and reasons , val ues , 
and cherished bel i e~s. This is not merely done to cause trouble but to 
consequences of tte ~eliefs we hol d and act upon . 135 Professor Zevin's 
article is in r.:a:-:y ~-ays obscure. He does not , for example, settl e the 
issue as to whether critical thinking is itself a necessary part of 
philosophical thini::ng or whether there are parts of critical thinking 
altogetner distinct ~rom it . Nonetheless , the article does serve to 
highlight the cardi~al role which the analysis of meaning pl ays in 
philosophical thinking. Thi s is the first point that could be addressed 
i n uri:~sin5 toce-:::e~· ~n argtu11em for philc sophy ' s u:1i q_ue c :)r, -;;.rit ut i c :: 
to t hi ~~ing . )" t ~~-:~ the a nalysis of meaning is const rued in Zevin' s 
35rb" , "' 267 .1.u ., l:"" • • 
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article largely as the contribution of phil osophy to an understanding 
of the meaning of life, it is as pertinent to the understanding of 
language, as it is to thought itself. Hospers expresses the relationship 
between philosophy, meaning and language well when he writes : 
We shall not primaril y be asking t he questions that laymen 
usually think of when they hear the world 'phil osophy ' , 
namely 'philosophy of life' .. . One must f irst develop tools for dealing with them . • . Where, then, shall we begin? ... 
with a study of language: not a study of the history of words, 
or the derivation of words, or the structural simil arities of 
words, or for t hat matter anything about words which is pecul iar to specific languages, but rather the nature and function of language in general - especially t he relation of words to what 
words stand for. ' 36 
In other words, philosophy's contribution to thinking made -i.n terms of 
the analysis of meaning applies equally well to the meaning of language 
and thought as it does to the meaning of everyday l ife. 
may be no di fferent to those required, for example, in a critical 
analysis of the validity of an argument. This being so, phi losophical 
thinking construed primarily as the anal ysis of meaning may not require 
a specific set of thinking skills pecul iar to that undertaking alone . 
The analysis of meaning needs a further qualification, theref ore, before 
it can adequately serve to identify philosophy's unique contribution 
to thinking. The uniqueness is perhaps best understood more in terms 
of· t he :::ea~i ngs 1·:hic~ one s elects to think about . Fer exampl e , tt i r'!~:: :1i· 
phil osophically about another person ' s discour se involves , on -:his \·ie"; , 
thinking about the meaning of what is said by choosin6 t o th i nk about 
36John Hospers , An Introcuction to Philosonhi c3l .\no.l:rsis , 4t h ed ., (New Jersey: Prentice- Hall , 1957) p . xii. 
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things like the range of possible motivations the person has for saying 
whatever it i s he is saying, and the range of possible interpretations 
of which t he disco~rse admits. A critical assessment, on the other 
hand, is more like::.~- to select for an analysis the validity and 
reliability o: a ais:ourse where thoughts t urn to issues like coherency, 
consistency and ev::. iential instantiation. 
The abil ity ~o sustain inquiry for long periods is a second point 
which J be:1.:.e·: -:: , ~·· ' ""eat u '::"e :in a!". ar;;·:..'-:le:-:t for philosophy ' s unique 
contribution -co th:.::~:ing ability. ':i:his capacity entails not only the 
capaci ty ::o!· :;:r.:~c,.; e~ attention on a particular problem and all it s 
nuances, but it also entails a willingness to engage in an inquiry where 
answers are not guaranteed and, in some cases, may not even by possible. 
The analyses o: ~ea:-:: :-:g , in particular , the meaning of language , and 
- , ... ._ - ... :: ~-
philosophy bot:: ser-:e to develop this capacity by providing situations 
where analys::.s car: ·::e sustained virtually ad infinitum. In bot h cases , 
inquiry can be uphe:d for at least as long as i t takes the inquirer to 
reach his /her desirei level of understanding ; maybe one hour , maybe a 
lifetime. The iCTpor~ance of these types of flexi ble, open ended 
situations to the c.evelopment of thinking ability is als() acknowledged 
by Zevin. 
=~~..."!::e?.·s 2 .. : ·..:.:...: ':".=:. ce u!'~"'ai~ o:~ :~a~ ... :.::c ?!~ovoc ati ve q1..1e s:.:.v!1r: 
unans~ered or ; ar ~ially ans~ered . .. Thinking , critical or 
othen..-ise , is ·: ::..e~;ed by most people as unnecessary a fter ·.rery definite concl~s ions have been reached.37 
37
.Jack '.:.e \· :'... :: , ' ':':-::.~~:ing Crit i c::.lly , :'tinking P~ilosophically ', p . 268 . 
In conclusion then, it would be inaccurate to characterize 
philosophy as the sole purveyor of thinking skills unless the term 
'thinking skills ' was being used in the sense of 'philosophical 
thinking skills ' alone. The more important poi nt to be drawn from the 
f oregoing discussi on , however , is that if the i mplementat ion of philosophy 
:i.nto the school curriculum is to continue solely on the bas is of its 
capacity to improve t hinking , then it is the development of phi losophical 
thinking skills that needs to be emphasized . 
I believe, however, that phi losophys contribution to education is 
nuch !!lore ·:ari ed. t han i ts beneficial eff ects upon t hinking abilit y . 
Moreover, I submit that the other advantages of studying philosophy which 
I will consider i n the next chapter , are equally , if not more , important 
than those discussed here . It is unfortunate that the thinking skill s 
, .. , -::: ' ...... 
.;. ....... 
whi le it is not difficult to show philosophy's important contribution to 
thinking , t ~e orientation tends to trade on the underplaying of t hese 
other benefits which phil osophy has for those who study it . 
C H A P T E R I I I 
OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR P~ECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY 
In this chapter I will examine three proposals which have been 
advanced in support of precollege philosophy. They are: (i) philosophy 
can act as a buffer to indoctrination; (ii) philosophy affords a 
framework in terms of which the curriculum can be integrated; and (iii) . 
1Jl'. :i :!.osophy C:8'1 'c!"ins; :-:ore meanin~ :: m., -:.:;e: J.i ves of those whc pursue it,. 
My primary concern is to explain each claim and to consider its strength 
in l ight of both its co~erency and tne cojections that have been raised 
against it. Each of the clai ms has at some time been cast in terms which 
render the purported benefits of studying philosophy as being peculiar 
to that discipline alone. Accordingly, I a.~ also concerned in this 
cha1:r~er to deter:::-.ine -:.~e valicii '.;-:, o: ~~~·s.:-:-.ir.;; ~he c _ai:ns as ce:.::.~ t:.r.iq_~~ 
to philosophy . 
Precollege Philosouhy a~d Indoctrination 
A key point delineating the rationale for precollege philosophy 
is that philosophy can serve as a buffer to indoctrination. This is the 
view that philosophy can afford a protection against indoctrination , a 
protection that is, abainst the closing of minds on matters tr.at are 
fundamentally open , , .. :hether it be value theory, social and political 
theory, or scientific theory . In this section I will examine this 
argu.r:ient , considerint:; also the maj or objection that has been rai sed 
62 
63 
against it. Before conunencing this task, however, it will be useful to 
provide a brief exp~sition 'of the term ' indoctrination ' as it is used by 
the proponents of ~recollege philosophy. 
The term 'intoctrination' has been used in the philosophy for 
children ' s literat~re in two ways . First, ' indoctrination' is used to 
refer to that process whereby, as a result of a particular course of 
study, students are ·.1:1questionably imbued with a specific set of values 
.r ~el i e~s . 8~ ~~:.7 ::.e~ 1 jrioctrination can occur by vir~ue o~ the 
course c:::mte;.t and/~r "!;he way in which it is taught. In both cases, 
i ndcctr:.nat::.on is sa:.i to have occurred whether or not the result was 
intended. In other ~ords , the criterion for indoctrination here is not 
so much the nature c: the held belief , as it is the way in which it is 
r.eld. Cn t i is acco·.::.::, indoctrination is the process which results in 
:..t.c- uncr:.1. :..:::a::.. ace e:;-: ; . .::ce of' inf orma"tion; i?.I'ormation concerr.ine; a::. l 
human endeaYours w~e-::-.er it be values and morality , for example , or 
science and polit:.cs. Granted this extensive framework, however, the 
issue is most typica::..~y discussed in the precollege philosophy 
literature ~ith reference to moral education . Different theoretical 
approaches to morali~y have led to the implementation of a variety of 
moral education pro~ra..~s . Some ' portray morality as efficient 
reasonin~ , other co~s~rue morality as obedience and acceptance of 
discipline ', while ' : -:~ers interpret the child as being naturally 
virtuous so that goc~ ~ehaviour will naturally ensue if only the 
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emotions are unthwarted and sensitivity to others heightened' . 1 What 
is i mportant is t hat either one of two extreme goals for moral education 
~s prescribed : either , that there exists a specific set of values which 
children should acquire; or , that because values are relative and 
because t here are divergent opinions with respect to those values , nothing 
is right or wrong. The point which advocates of philosophy for chi ldren 
want to emphasize i s that in neither case are children equipped with the 
skills requisite for assessing the vali dity of either position nor the 
values it entails. 
·.-'he second sense in ~.,hicc. 1 indoc~ri!'la"'...ion ' cas teen usea. ir- t.he 
precollege philosophy literature relates directly to the notion of the 
hidden curriculum. On this account , 'indoctrination ' is used to refer 
to that process whereby the elimination of possible courses or course 
_ ............ 
reinforces both the value and authority of those that are i ncluded . 
Three exanples are given below by way of illustration of this process. 
The first concerns religious education in Australia . In most cases , t~e 
Christian point of view is expounded to such an extent that even the ~ere 
recognition of the existence of other points of view is absent . On the 
view defended here , such a pedagogy could be indicted as indoctrinatio!'l 
on the grounds of being a covert, yet power ful means to instil in the 
mi nds of those w!",o ,:ncertake its study a :\mc.a"'::ental belief i~ t.l1e 
supremacy of Christianity. The second exa'l:ple i s afforded by Jane ~ . 
~:at thew :.ip:::ar, and Ann ;,1 . Sharp , Growin.---: Un with Ph i losoplw , " 2an , ' . ,, f f ' . J. h ' J. - • t ' " 11 ( Pl ' • d • , . t,:oral E..:~tc:,i: lO!~ '.te '2iv01:-ced ro::, rn osop ica .::.auca ion . ~.::.._::;. e ... -::-:":io : Te:nple Ui~iversity Press , 1978) , p . 341.. . 
Martin in her article 'What should social philosophy be for children?' , 
where she similarily accuses the school system of encouraging in our 
young an uncritical acceptance of the status quo . 2 The ar gument in this 
case is that unless education can actively encourage questioning and 
criticism of the existing socio- political background and the perception 
of viable alternatives, it will carry with it a social and political 
presumpti on in respect of acceptance of things as they are; in terms 
ti:s t j_s $ of' an unthinki ng acceptance of existing institutions and 
practices. A third example, this time in respect of science and 
indoctrination , is a f forded by R.S . Laura who argues that science and 
its technology have been transferred into institutional components of t he 
status quo, in desperate need of critical appraisal . 3 As a result of the 
pervasiveness of the scientific idiom that stems from such authority, it 
approaches to problems and dispositions in thinking which do not 
approximate the traditional concept of being ' scientific ' are discouraged , 
and in some cases suppressed. In other words , the contention is that the 
uncritical acceptance of the authority of sc i ence has so influenced the 
value structure of education that the educative process itself can now 
be indicted for indoctrinating the authority of science . 
How then do proponents of precollege phil osophy propose that 
?::L.:.o.sop:1y can ser ve to count era..::t --chese forces of i ndoct. r ina~ion ·,' ::.::c-
2rbid , "What Should Social Philosophy be for Children?" p.180. 
~ 
.JRonald S . Laura , "The Philosophical Foundations of Science Education" , ;:,,"..ucat i on, ?hi losonhy and Theory 13, 1980 , pp .1- 13 , 
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dominant argwnent in the field has been advanced by the advocates of the 
Philosophy for Children Approach to precollege philosophy. Consistent 
with this origin, the argument focuses upon philosophy as a method of 
critical and conceptual analysis and the ways i n which these ski lls 
function to buffer indoctrination . The proposal is that by developing 
an appreciation for the philosophical method, in particular the skills 
of reasoning and of inquiry through discourse, philosophy affords its 
st.udents acc ess to the ~abj_t of :i.ndependent, r eflective thinki!lg . Tte 
c1a.i n that follows, a claim. that is also a rather strong claim is that , 
once children have acquired the skills they need for critical assessment 
they can turn to any of the probl ems in moral education , science , 
social or political education , with the legitimate hope of reaching a 
h?.la~c ed unders t anding of t he issues involved . Moreover , the contention 
is t hat as chil dren appropriate these i;;idl.:'..s and C!"'i:,5 ti,er.. -: ::: "i:e:;;.::- .~r-.,.: 
those situati ons confronted both within and without the school context, 
they are to a ~uch greater extent protected against i ndoctrination , since 
all experiences and poi nts of view which they encounter are screened 
through this framework of critical assessment . A closer examination of 
the philosophic method , that is , phi l osophic reasoning and discourse, 
will provide a better understandi ng of the speci fic ways in which 
phi losophy is believed, on this view, to act as a buffer to i ndoctrination . 
As it is used in the context of philosophy f or children , ' philoso r:!1 ::. -:: 
reasoning ' refers to both that form of deductive reasoning derived from 
the tradition of formal logic, and that mode -of rea soning subs umed unde~: 
informal l ogic which includes inductive reasoning and the reasoning 
employed in the search for establishing 800d grounds for argument. 
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When these reasoning skills are brought to bear upon problematic 
situations, t he probability of an adequate critical appraisal is 
supposedly enhanced, and the child i s better placed to advance 
constructive ideas which can be acted upon to bring out changes where 
necessary. For exanple, the principles of informal logic such as 
c01isistency , i::,par t ::.a:j ty, and. COJ:ll, rehensi veness , are believed to be 
important for developing an objective framework for cr itical assessment. 
I n other wo:::·ds , tne philosophy for children approach teaches children 
that the appropriate assessment of reasons etc. is made in terms of 
their consistency and comprehensiveness wherein personal biases are put 
aside, if not overcorr.e. This is particular ly apparent in the program 
·"r1el"! the c::1 ::.::_dr·e::: &re cor:.cernec. · .. ;i t:h c.e-:e:i.·.:::ining 'the q_ua=.i t:f of an 
information source . For mal logic , on the other hand , is taught as a 
method more appropriate f or assessing the credibility of an argun1ent i n 
terms of its logical cohesion. That is , children are encouraged to use, 
for example, the rules of syllogistic inference when determining the 
truth of a claim . The skills from both the formal and nonformal arenas 
are believed to work co-operatively to buffer uncritical acceptance of 
the ideas of those who, consciously or unconsciously, seek to indoctrinate. 
'-!oreover, what is generally n:eant by ' independent thinking ' in children 
refers to a fac i lity with these comprehensive skills of reason in their 
application both to an analysis of the thoughts of others and to the 
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critical analysis o~ one ' s own thoughts. 'Independent thinking ', that 
js, involves subjec: :ng one ' s own musings to the same rigorous analysis 
to which one would :·.:.bject the thought of others . Philosophical discourse , 
on the other hand, :s said to provide an environment which is~oth s ensitive to 
philosophi c issues a~i respectful of differing points of view. The 
philosophy for chi:i =en approach advances this framework as being crucial 
for both critical as sessment and philosophic modes of inquiry . In abiding 
by t he principles c:· :nf orma l l ogic set down f or philosophical discussions, 
the participants lea=~ that an array of opinions different from their own 
uay l eg :i.t. i ~atel:,· :.c: ::::;,any the reasonin6 t ied to a. particular a:::-ea cf 
interest. Partici~a::on in philosophical discussion is believed to 
strengthen one 's ir.:t..;.iry skills as they are openly practiced , and it 
broadens t he chilc :::' e~'s repertoire of skills as they observe the critical 
the scope of releva~: arguments and counterarguments upon which children 
can dr aw s3ould b e =: :::'e extensive and more accessible a f ter t hey have 
participated in a c:=...::-.unity of inquiry. Children can mentally rehearse 
the range of positic~s both similar to and different from their own and 
in so doing , bring a ~eeper understanding to bear upon the issue in need 
of appraisal. The s·.:.ggest ion is that an experience of the ways in which 
others think and t~e ensuing familiarity with a wide range of intellectual 
habits should enco~·s.ge broader , more comprehensive assessments of 
s i tuations than i ~ :~i nking skil ls are presented atomistically in the 
absence of t he oppc=:~nity of shared expression . 
This is the main argument that has been proposed to show that 
philosophy for children is an appropriate tool for counteracting potential 
forces of indoctrination. It is also the argument which has led parents 
to object most strongly to the introduction of philosophy into the schools . 
Before then considering the l imits of this claim, let us examine both the 
objection that parents are wont to make and the type of response that is 
most often provided to counter it. The objection made by parents is 
t~et the developnent of independent thinking in our young , also affords t;.e~: 
the opportunity to reject more readily the values of the home and society. 
Based on the fearful assumption that the clear and unbiased cri ticis::! of 
these values will lend automatically to their rejection, the argument has 
been extended by means of specious reasoning to the following types of 
conclusions. First in the case of parental values, it is concluded 
and adopt values other than those of the home . Second , i n the case of 
societal values, the conclusion dra,m is that children will become anarchical 
or revolutionary . While it is to be granted that some children will follow 
these courses, it is neither the case that all children will do so, nor 
that there will be a larger proportion that do so after having undertaken 
a philosophy program . To assert, for example, that the children who 
undertake philosophy will reject the society's values, is to make two 
unwarranted assurnptions. On the one hand it suggests that children have 
s i~ilar priorities with respect to values and, on the other ttat they 
would choose to behave similarily and reject those values. 
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Clyde Evans in his article 'Philosophical Thinking: An Ally for 
Parental Values ' responds to this objection by arguing that if parental 
teaching is to be successful, it must be capable of withstanding the 
4 
critical assessment of those to whom it is taught. The philosophy for 
children program i s concerned equally with drawing out bot h t he negative 
and positive aspects of any given situation so that children come to 
understand ~ore clearly what the ethical possibilities are within that 
s i t uation b e~~ore :,;ald:ig a c.ecision about it . According to Evar.s, this 
process of critical a ssessment is important for two reasons . First , on 
the assumption that parents are not merely interested i n pr ogra~ill1ing 
their children to behave rightly, moral education needs to encourage 
children to question and assess a whole range of values for themselves. 
It is only after such analysis that any value can be held with cor.unitment 
and reason. I:'}c.eed , part of what it means to have benaveo. r i g:~t.lJ is 
that one is sufficiently informed to discriminate right from wrong and 
freely chooses to do so. Secondly , he argues that if the re j ection of 
one value fro~ a system is not to l ead to the rejection of the entire 
·system of values, then each val ue needs to be assessed cri tically 
according to its own merits. In the case of parental teachi ng , for 
example, the rej ection of one value from the set will automaticall y lead 
to the rejection of t he entire set of parental values. Needless to say , 
Evans is not alone in thinki ng that it is almost i nevitable t hat a t a 
certain stage in the child' s devel opment he/she will reject s ome 
particular aspect of t he parents teachings . 
4 Li pman and Shar p , Gro1dnG Up with Philosophy , "Philosophical Thinkin; : 
.,.\n .t\lJy for ?a!"ental Values", b;{ Cl yde Evans, p . 375 , 
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In t:ie l ight o:' this response, the objection raised against 
fostering indepenae~~ thinking in young children cannot be so easily 
sustained. For i f ;arents a re concerned that children uphold their 
values , then it is ~he capacity to think independently and reflectively 
that will ensure t~a~ those values are held with the required conunitment . 
Such commitment car. only be given after a full consideration of t he 
assumptions underp:r.~ing, and the implications of, those values. 
Philosophy for ch::~~en then is designed neither to undermine children ' s 
beliefs nor to erole parental values . Its purported obj ective is rather 
to help childrec es:atlis~ firner foundations for believing those things 
they have chosen, ~;03 refl ection, to believe in. 
I n sum, the ;rimary argument in favour of philosophy for children 
as a means to cou~~e~act the forces of indoctrination is advanced on the 
thinking strategies . On this view of philosophy for children , practice 
in the reasoning a~~ i isc ourse enjoined by philosophy enhances the 
capacity in those .. -:-_:; study it not only for assessing the structures in 
terms of which thei~ own thinking takes place, but also for bringing to 
bear upon all matteis the f ramework of critical assessment. I n other 
words, the uncritica: acceptance of subject-matter, beliefs or values is 
discouraged in favo~r of that kind of acceptance WQich accrues as a 
result of the indi,:~~al' s own pursui t for the meaning , relevance and 
credibility of t he :ssue at hand . Of course there is still the threat 
of parents and teac~ers who consciously seek to program children into 
believing certain t~:r.gs or behaving i n certain ways . In this case , 
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there is no guarantee that the philosophy for children program will be 
successful in buffering the effects of indoctrination. Indeed , it would 
be difficult to guarantee the ~uccess of any program which hoped to 
counter the effects of indoctrination when it was placed in the hands of 
persons with such rigid goals for children. 
Let us now turn to a more critical examinat ion of the indoctrination 
claim . There are three features of the philosophy for children pr ogram 
·,::· :.c-h ac t ually se::._··:e to mitigate ~he si: ::-e:ngth of this pr oposa l. 
'rhe first relates to the t opics about which reasoned cri ticisr:: i s 
encouraged. While the Philosophy for Children program cla il.~s to provide 
the tools requisite for engagi ng in reasoned criticism in all situations 
both within and without the school setting, it has been critic ized for 
E.r.couragi.ng reasc~ed c:."i :.icism in a li!':li ted co!:.t e:(t . \1cre s-;ecifica:i.::..:, , 
it has been indicted for ignoring t he political and social background 
against which most of the teaching materials are s et . In her article , 
' What Should Social Philosophy be f or Children? ' Jane R. Mart in points 
out that the moral dileI!lil'.as which are used in this program for instruction 
in ethics do not turn critically upon the framework in which they are set . 5 
Accordingly, she argues that in this regard the philosophy for children 
program ser ves to reinforce the view that the contexts in which the 
dilem.~as arise are themselves unproblematic . The criticism is that in 
t~e absence of soc~~l and politic~l critical rei'lection , t:,e r:~·ocr::i.::; 
serves to foster an unthinking acceptance of the s t atus quo . Stated more 
5roid . , "1,nat Should Social Phi losophy be for C:1ildren", by Jane ~ . 
t.lartin, pp .188- 192. 
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strongly, the accusation is that of indoctrination for soc ial and political 
c0nservatis!!l. Thi s criticism is severe, yet the conditions for its 
avoidance are easy ~o est ablish . Any program which hoped to buffer the 
forces of indoctrination by reasoned criticism, that i s, would need onl y 
encourage the use o: this technique in all domains including those , 
social and politica2.. While time may not permit the actual practice of 
reasoned criticism ::.n all areas , it is necessary that children be made 
aware not or:l y of i ·_ 3 :re2. evance t o all cont exts but also of w~at tr..ose 
contexts can be . 
'I'he second c ::-:. ~icism of philosophy for chil dren concer::s the 
hidden curriculum w::ich the program itself appear s to engender . The 
underlying claim of t,his program is that reasoned cri ticism will suffice 
as a protection aga:::st indoctrination. While independent , reflective 
1,hou.gh-t i s i ::iport,ar.-: ·:o ouffer indoctrinat ion, t te view t nat, -:his is a.:.l 
which is required needs to be resisted . The basis for this critic i sm is 
twofold . First, the philosophy for children program ne i t her subjects the 
limits nor the tools of philosophical reasoni ng and discourse to critical 
reflection . On the contrary, these methods , most particularly formal 
and infernal logic, are present ed as techniques adequate for establishing 
the complete critica2. appraisal of an issue . The poi nt here is not that 
chi l dren need , fo r example , to confr ont t he sophi sticated philosophical 
debates in respect c : the actual powers of logic to ascertain truth . It 
is rather t hat , in : ::.5nt of the existence of these debates , teaching 
which does not acknc~,-:.edge sone degree of flexibility with respect t o 
the::.r powe1·s is susceptible of t he title, ' indoctrination ' . T."'!e s econd 
problem with using reasoned criticism as a tool sufficient to buffer 
indoctrination is that it assumes that all the potentially indoctrinating 
aspects of a situation admit of critical reflection. This assumption is 
unsound, unsound because even in those situations where time permits the 
deliberation of all possible alternatives, there are alternatives which 
are made inaccessible to the individual by virtue of his knowledge and 
experience. Therefore, any program which hopes to use reasoned criticism 
as a means of ?Yotection against indoctrination must also addYess these 
two issues. On both accounts the recommendation which might perhaps 
1~cs1.. dispeJ. tr.e negatj_ve features of t:.1e hidden cur:!'.'iculum is one which 
encourages the development of awareness : an awareness of tne limits of 
critical thinking; and, ~n awareness that a situation might contain 
factors presently incapable of being recognized . This type o~ approach 
is both readily accessible and easily implemented . 
The third major problem of the approach of reasoned criticism to 
indoctrination is that it depends for its success entirely upon the 
students actual ly using their newly acquired skills and this in turn 
depends upon their being motivated to do so . Reasoned criticism as a 
means of buffeYing indoctrination has much to recommend it when the skills 
peculiar to it are employed . It is not enough, however, that the student 
acquire and be adept with these thinking skills , he/she must also choose 
to use the::: in t::e appropriate contexts . ':he dif .. ~icult:,· o::.~ ::cc ti·,::itit~:.:; 
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students to think is widely acknowledged . 6•7 The problem is well stated, 
for example, by Joh::i :-~cPeck when he writes that ' getting people to think 
critically may=-~ :'a:~ be like getting them to act morally ' , and he 
concludes that 
training in par~:.cular critical thinking skills is not 
sufficient to pr~iuce a crit ical thinker. One must also develop the di s;~sition to use these ski lls .8 
'I'herefore, any progr~~ which hoped to develop the capacity for reasoned 
critic ism as a · ... oo:. ·:o buffer the effects of indoctrination would also 
need to inspire t~e ~ot i vat i on to use that t ool . The philosophy for 
c-hildre!1 apprca:::. i='. :-.:)t directly concern.ed with -chis objecti,·e , although 
~tis intimated a~ ~=-~es. In this approach, for example , the philosophical 
issues are set in cc~"texts typical of the real life situations of its 
readers. Inso~ar a s students come to appreciate the role of reasoned 
legitimately ant:.ci~e.~e that the motivat i on to use the skill would i tself 
be enhanced·. Eo· .. ,e,·er , for this type of philosophy program to be 
successful in cour.teracting the forces of indoctrination, t he t echniques 
for inspiring no"tiYa~ion would need to be addressed more directly than 
they are here . It :sin this capacity that a philosophy progr am would 
benefit immeasuraoly from components designed to inspire a love of 
wisdom. 
6
,rimothy J . Eerge:-. and E . I . Nwamuo , "Critic al Thinking : A Sign of t he 
~::..::!e;·s ", ..1.:1, ly": :: -=,?~. ~ ·:-. :. r.:- 3l 2), ::.9e3, PP . 31- 3:. . 
1J ohn E . ~-!cPeci< , 2::-itical Thinking and Education , (New York: St . Martin ' s Press , 198::. , , p . 19 . 
8Ibid . 
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These three problems then are perhaps the ones which present the 
most severe limitations upon r easoned criticism as an approach to buffer 
jndoctrination . Phil osophy programs which choose to use this approach , 
however, need little amendment to make their impact upon potential forces 
of indoctrination much more marked. Now that some limitations of the 
' indoctrination' claim have been cons.ider ed , let us examine the extent 
to which phil osophy' s purported benefits in this regard are uni que. The 
philosophy for children approach rests solely upon the acquisition a nd 
development of reasoned criticism and cri tical reflection as a means of 
protect i on against i ndoc tri nat ion . This philosophy progra~ , indeed any 
philosophy program which adopts this approach to indoctrina~ion, therefore , 
does not off er a technique which differs greatly from any of those 
acqui red in a gener al critical thinki ng program . Construed in this way , 
unique. Does philosophy then have anything unique to contribute t o the 
fight against indoctr ination? Yes. One such cont ribution is t hat which 
is made possible by the •,1ealth of' l iterature known as philosophy . This 
r ole for philosophy is , on the whole , l eft poorly articulated in the 
literature . 
Philosophy has traditionally concerned itself with t he kind of 
issues ~hat pervade everyday l ife and the meaning of what it is to be 
human . For example, the problem of identity , the continuity of existence , 
the existe:;ce o: ..' Go~~. :·~e: :,i2.l o.:,d dete~:~!ini ::::: , the richt -:.o 2.i :'e an.i 
abortion , and a host of other moral i ssues are of central concern to 
philosophers . It is from t h is framework of knowled g e 
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that philosophy has a unique contribution to make in respect of indoctrination. 
'J'h:roue;h recogn:i.zing that many -riewpoints can accrue to an issue, stude::ts 
are less likely to succtunb to the unexamined acceptance of any one 
particular view in respect of it. Moreover , by exploring a wide range of 
viewpoints, students come to appreciate that it is not only the widely- held 
beliefs that are worthy of attention. Students learn also to appreciate 
the value of many different responses, even the unusual response. There 
is one caution that needs to be made here , however, If a range of vie,,s 
is presented for consideration on ~ost occasions, then one needs to be 
aware that a co=.":citment to a neut ral ~ ' always non-commital ' att i tude i s 
not unconsciously encouraged. While it may be important to harbor this 
view on some issues, it would be !'llisleading to uphold it as the ideal 
orjentation to all situations. One would need to consider seriously, :or 
't • • - .. ~ ... 
......................... _ 
holocaust. In other words, the acquisition of the general skills 
appropriate to reasoned criticisn are important to counter indoctrinatio~ , 
but equally inportant is an understanding of the materials to which they are 
applied; an appreciation, for example , of the ethical consequences of 
logical choices. 
Precollege Philosophy and t he Unification of the School Curriculur: 
..... ~ . .: .. .... - ... _.,, .... 
:-··.L. - ........ ; ·· ,· 
was first raised by :-1atthew Lipnan in his book Philosophy in the Class~·oo::. . 
Basically, the clai:n is t hat philosophy provides a frar.1ework suitable :~o!· 
experiencing ed~ca~ion as a unified whole . 
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From the ti~e of Plato Western educators have projected two 
fundamental goals: ~~e integration of all knowledge and the full 
development of 1.:-:e :.:-:ii vidual. Lipman and his co-workers see philosophy 
in education as a ~eans to resurrect these goals; a method for enhancing 
children ' s abil:ty ~~ interrelate knowledge from various fields; and 
a method of inprovi~; their general capacity for learning . Lipman argues 
that philosophy ser·:es to integrate the diffuse elements of the school 
c- ,J.:rric1.1ltL~ ~~;t: c:_ :. -:E-::.~ in turn minimizes the frustration experienced by 
children as ·J .::ie~- Se-:~: to unite the pieces of a segmented school day . .., 
':he i ,'.'.:;:a~·; - -' ~:iis argument is particularly forceful since it. :r.us 
been brought forwar::. at a time when the knowledge explosion appears not 
only to be fragrr.ent::.::-:g all learning but also when the specialisatioP. it 
invokes seems U!1a•;c:..:.able for the foreseeable future . It is easy to 
.... - •\ ' . . .,. ... =--
- ---- -- -·-
confront: ns ~heir school experience rni €h: ~ee _ 
daunted by the pros;ect of obtaining expertise in one area or even a 
fat":iliari ty r.-;i t:1 a ,:..:...-::ber of areas . Indeed, it is reasonable to 
anticipate that c~i:~~en will expect only to acquire bits and pieces of 
knowledge in the ho:;:e that it will become meaningful or useful at a later 
time. The view t~a~ the present fragmentarily structured school day 
reinforces this at~:~ude has, therefore, much to reconunend it . Lipman 's 
argument in favo~r c : philosophy i n the schools gains its full purchase 
in this context. :: ·:en the growth of knowledge and its di visio:1 into 
separate discip:ii'.:e;; , it is not so much that the present subject by 
9Matthew Li p:-~e.:: , . .:..,.:: ~i . Sharp and Frederick J . Oscanyan , Phi l osophy i n t he Cl~::-s !'<'"'::-., : ::::. ed . (Philadel phia : Temple University Fress , 1980, p . 26 . 
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subject structure of the school day is inappropriate, rather it is the 
manner in w1:l i ch t r:e s ubjects a r e generally pres ented that admits of 
improvement. Instead of presenting the disciplines as discrete entities 
in terms peculiar only to themselves , Lipman ' s point is that phi losophy 
provides a single framework from which all disciplines can be similarly 
appreciated . 
The 'framework' to wh i ch Lipman refers here is characterized by two 
~eatures. ~t c~~s~itute3 both an awarer.ess of the epi stemolo5i cal , 
metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic dimensions of differen~ disciplines , 
and a f acility 1-itn t he reflective or analytic habit of mind . By 
virtue of its concern to clarify concepts and make explicit the framework 
assumptions upon which they depend, his claim is t hat philosophy provides 
t he necessar y co~cept ua l tool s f or analyzing and compar ing a l l t he 
c.i i'i'erent 1.::scip.:..:. r.es i n the curriculur.-. according to "these dimensions . 
In other words , the educational experience becomes unif ied through the 
understanding that most subjects admit of philosophical analysis, whether 
it be episte~ological , ethical or aesthetic . 
In addition to these two aspects of philosophy , one of the 
pedagogical principles which is encouraged by proponents of precol lege 
philosophy is an openness to children ' s questions . Unlike the more 
traditional approaches to t eaching which have tended to reinforce only 
t'I"i!"lci~~e 
. -
·,.·:-.ich pe:r:::it of a sir.1ple s0lution , to\,.. • .:_- ... 
... J._ .L.. • 
those quest ions •.;hich children ask l ike 'What is a fact? ', ' Wha t is 
history?' and ' How can we be sure of anything? ' into bold r elie f . \•: i thin 
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the philosophy for schoolchildren program, for example, these questions 
· " e ne i t.h<:n ·i r.ncred nm: treated per:.:'un(:i:.o;--j 2..y with respons es such as 
'That's not i mportant' or 'Don't be silly!' . On the contrary it is 
believed that it is just such questions that can, and should be, used 
to nurture the reflective habit of mind. By considering questions such 
as these, the resulting analysis affords examples of the extent to which 
a wide range of subjects a&~it of the same conceptual foundat i ons. For 
cx2.:'.1p1e , the c:;_uesticn 1 ::c·,; ca!'l you k!'l.o" t.bat ? 1 i n a ::1aths class can lesc: 
to the discovery that the epistemological problem to which i t refers 
transcends discipline boundaries and may just a s readily be of relevance 
to english, french or history lessons. These philosophical questions 
are basic, basic in that they underpin the disparate subject matters which 
they a l one can unify. I t is the children, then, who in this sense 
The conceptual tools imparted to them serve to dissipate the previously 
unavoi dable frustration of having to understand a school experience whi c:-. 
by the very nature of its structure, is fragmentary . 
The argument given here serves to mitigate the view that philosophy 
merely represents another subject to be added to an already overcrowded 
curriculum. In anticipation of this objection, it is argued that 
precollege philosophy is given its most correct ascription when it is 
v::. ewed as provi ding a f r a..>nework i n terms of which t he entire cur :dcttl u:-:: 
can be better understood. This model of philosophy is described as 
havine; hi storical precendence in John Dewey's theories on education . 
Dewey is quot ed : 
philos9phy can be the comprehensive and foundational 
discipline for a~~ curricular undertakings, so that . • . 
:1enef'i.ts .. . , 2.:-. -,::c rue to the ent:i.re range of subject 
:,.1.i..tc- ;-;; "'~: . .-:· : ~: elementary school students have to deal . 
Philosophy, t.::e::-., could be appropriated as a subject area, 
and transformed :::· simplification, into a single elementary 
school subject, -: .:- be inserted into the curriculum along 
with other suoject.s . Here, philosophy may be seen as an 
ideal way of o ::::-e=.::i z i ng the somewhat chaotic field kno.m 
as ' language arts' so as to encompass all forms of thought 
and creative exp~·ession. Or , most ambitiously, philosophy 
may be taken as ~~e central methodology or armature around 
which all subjec~s can be organised, in that it provides 
the model of c::. s:: :·:ery and participation that can be 
u~i.li s ed "oy :::z :::· ::.::.:~f~rent tes.c:::e::'s ~·or ~any different 
sub.jects . : :: -_::.:.~ 3ense , :phi.:.:,sophy ca:l beco;::e a flrnds:::e:-:-:s.l 
discipline i r.-:;o ·.::-.ich all others are integrated and from 
which they ce::--:. ·:e ~heir theoretical and methodological 
orientation . :_~· 
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The integrat ::.c:: of the curriculum then, is a uni que contribution 
that philosophy can ~a~e to precollege education. A vari ety of thinking 
skills programs c a:: :.:;·.relop the tools of conceptual analysis . s ~ch 
upon the episte~o~og:.::al , metaphysical or aesthe~ic dimensions of a 
su_bject unless ~~e:.· s.iso educate for an understanding of those aspects 
of philosophy . 
Although Lip~an brings foTward his argument here as a strong 
motivation for doir.g pnilosophy with children, the philosophy ~or children 
program itsel f does ::ot directly address the ways in which the experience 
cf integration is tc 8e achieved . Rather, his approach implies that 
ir.te~rat::..on occ ·.:::::- s s.2 an a uto!::2t ic ty- product of doing philoso:;,:1.y . In 
other words, Lip~an 1 s proposal is that the development of thinking skills 
10
narrell R . S:-.e;:::!·::. , 11The Philosopher as Teacher 11 , ?-letaDhi 1 osouhy 
9(2), 19';"3 , pp . : ?~- :~·.: ; 
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and their application to various philosophic analyses will be sufficient 
to experience the curriculum as a unified whole. While I do not wish to 
deny that there are some children who may achieve this understanding 
without any further elaboration by the teacher, I am not inclined to the 
view that this will suffice for all children. Given the range of 
individual differences in interests and intellectual ability, there is a 
need for explicit i nstruction concerning ways of integrating the 
curriculum. Not only would this ensure a better understanding of the 
}J~enol~!enon fer ~12.. c:i.:l.ldr eD ~ i "v ,, oul:i e,l.so e:1hance t hat ur.ders t c.nd.ing 
where it had in sorr!e way_ been already grasped. Any philosophy program 
which hoped to generate the experience of curriculum unification, 
therefore, ~ould on this account also be required to: (1) increase 
student awareness of curriculum unification and the ways in which it is 
achieved; and (2) recommend techniques for both demonstrating and 
practising the t ransf er of philoso:ph::.c::c~ ar..aly.:3es 1::.cro.:;s cor..-:.e::-.-.;s . 
Precollege Philosophy and A More Meaningful Life 
A third significant point adduced in support of incorporating 
philosophy into precollege education is that philosophic reflection can 
bring more meaning into the lives of those who pursue i t . The argument 
here is sponsored on the basis of three more specific claims, each of 
which proposes tr.at the study of philosophy is corrunensurate with 
investin,S the s-:· ~ ' s life ~i th more mea:1ing . 
The first claim relates back directly to the previous discussion, 
-the argument being that philosophy brings more meaning into children ' s 
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l ives by providing a framework in terms of which the school experience 
can itself be unified. This argument is elaborated upon i n the previous 
discussion. The point to be stressed here , however , is that chi ldren will 
almost inevitabl y cone to distrust an education they find meaningless 
which makes the experience of curriculum int egrati on an opportunity to 
embrace warmly and openly the events of the school day . 
The second claim relates to the view that philosophy can improve 
reasoning skills , anQ that an improvement in reasoning bestows an 
improvement in reading.To recapitulate, the suggestion is that we read to 
get meanings, and ttat the ability to grasp meaning involves not only an 
ability to discern wr.at a sentence says , but also what a sentence implies. 
Gi ven that this account is correct, it follows that the more readily 
children can draw inferences, the more meani ngs they should be able to 
:f'ind in what they r eE.c. . This in turn provides a bet ter comprehension of 
bot h the obvious and more subtl e meanings i n wri t t en passages . A second 
component to this argument is that a greater appreciation of literature 
develops through the realization that reading enables the acquisition of 
specific meanings. Philosophy is believed , therefore , to afford children 
the opportunity of finding more meaning in what they read, as well as 
fac i litat ing their use of readi ng as a tool to ac quire the specific 
information which might bring greater understanding to their lives . In 
ot her words children come to see reading as a tool in service of their 
needs, those needs which either demand probl em solving or concerning 
which they are particularly desirous of knowledge. The philosophy for 
children ' s literature tends to emphasize the relationship between 
8~ 
philosophy, meaning, and the written word. However,when reasoning skills 
are brought to bear upon verbal communications, a broader understanding of 
wh~t others mean is also more likely to be sustained. As a result of an 
enhanced appreciation of the panoply of interpretations that accrue in 
spoken communication, philosophy also has the potential to make personal 
interactions more meaningful . By way of facilitating the process of 
thinking, philosophy thereby enables children to think more comprehensively 
about wha·:, c"t:'!ers say . I t enables them to understand the views of 
ot her people r.,ore fully and to consider respectfully what it means to 
hold those ·n.-s•.,rs . I~sc:'ar as there are a number of nonphilosophically-
orientated curriculum which are also designed to develop reasoning capacity, 
it is not in the ways outlined here t hat philosophy's contribution to 
enriching lives is unique. For a better understanding of what this unique 
studying philosophy and having a more meaningful life. 
The third clain suggests that precollege philosophy enriches 
children's l ives oy contributing to their understanding of the world in 
a way in which neither the development of critical reasoning nor the 
b . t tt f th d ' . 1· d 11 su Jee ma ers o o er 1sc1p ines can o. Let us consider the two 
aspects of this clai~ separately. First, what are the alternatives to 
critical reasoning being intimated here? The suggestion is that 
philosophical thinking also requires the development of the intellectual 
and affective iMagination , t hat is, the ability to speculate imaginatively 
about ideas and feelings. Whereas logic and critical reasoning skills 
llL. .. 8' ~ ' U ' th Ph 'l h 8 ipmo.n and narp, •..:row1np; p 'Wl ~ 1 osop y, p . . 
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refine children's thinking so that the meanings they seek become more 
accessibl e and open to evaluation, the argument is that these other skills 
afford even a deeper understandi ng of the different disciplines and life 
events. In other words, the contexts from which meanings are derived, 
whether it be an academic discipl ine or a l ife event, are the~selves 
believed to be made more pellucid . For example, in subjects such as 
history, the development of the affective imagination enabl es students 
to i dentify with the h1.L~an beings of t he past t hroug~ an understanding 
of the propensities of human nature under different conditions . In t his 
way chi l dren can better appr eciate t he circumstances t hat prec i pitated 
certai n historical decisions, including those decisions which critical 
analysis alone may render -as being absurd. And in mathemat i cs , f or example , 
a greater understanding of t he important rol e pl ayed by numbers i n h~an 
Perhaps what is more import ant to the i dentifi cation of philosophy's 
unique contribution , however, is t he s ubject- matter of the discipl ine; 
the subject- matter, t hat is , which onl y phi l osophy can provide . Of 
particular importance is the body of literature that has accumulated from 
the grapplings t ha t phi losophers have had with the problems of understanding 
l ife itself . This includes, f or example, debates about metaphysical i ssues 
such as the true character of reality and the form of experience through 
which i t i s apprehended , to et h i cal and aesthet ic issues which are also 
relevant t o cont e~porar y life, such as children' s rights , the value of 
art , nuclear holocaust and capi tal punishment . Consider , fo r example , 
the value t hat di scussior.s about the nat ure of real i ty and its vo.rious 
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interpretations might have for students confronting psychedelic drug 
experience. If philosophical ideas and thinking could not replace the 
neeo. f or this experience t hen at least they mi ght assist to put t he 
experience in perspective and to better orientate the chi ld towards it. 
Consider also t he assis tance that ethical discussions about abortion , 
for example , may provide for young persons faced with such monwnental 
life choices. Philosophic literature presents an array of viewpoint s 
Oll any given iss~e. This can assist students · in two ways : first, it 
can impr ove their understanding of life events by providing them with a 
r ange of unthoug~t of alternatjves; ar.d second , it can s erve to ease 
the process of ma.king important choices by showi ng them that there is 
often not one correc t sol~tion to a problem, but rather , a number of 
equally valid and worthwhile ones. 
! rrt:i.nei::. ::ere :...s t.}1e view a..J.va,. :.; ei by ~us sell in tn.e ::.as·c; cha:: =.:'.' 
of his Problems of Philosophy, where he discusses the value of philosophy . 
He says that i f the study of philosophy has value for those ot her t ha n 
s tudents of philosophy , it must be thr ough its effects upon the lives of 
t hose who study it. 12 He goes on to claim that phi l osophy is to be 
studied because the questions it raises ' enlarge our conception of what 
is possible , enrich our intellectual i magination , and di minish t he 
dogmatic assur ance which closes the mi nd against speculation . . . ' . The 
same sentiments pervade the philosophy for childrens ' l iterat ur e . I f 
the relevance t hat philosophy has f or ordinary peopl e l iving or dinary 
12 8 ( Bertrand Russell , The Problems of Phi l osophy , t h ed . , London : Oxford Univer sity ?ress, 1978) , pp .93- 94 . 
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l ives were accepted , ::. t is urged·, then ways of letti ng philosophy enr ich 
those same J :i 0:es no :-:-:~":. ".: e r what the age of t he person must also be 
possible . Having ta~e~ practi cal steps to bring philosophy into people ' s 
lives, those worki ng ~-ith precollege philosophy have designed progranunes 
in philosophy speci:::.:~l l y aimed at enriching the lives of children . 
C H A P T E R I V 
THE VIABILITY OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY 
This chapter is concerned with the viability of precollege 
philosophy. Two aspects of viability are considered here: (i) the 
viability of a curriculum in respect of the student's actual ability to 
think in the ways that the subject matter requires; and (ii) the 
vja.biliiy of a curr:iculum in respect o:' the student ' s interest in or 
readiness for confronting the kinds of issues that the subject matter 
e::::tails . 
The first section of this chapter is concerned with the viability 
of precollege philosophy fn terms of the younger student's cognitive 
ability to deal with the type of thinking that it requires. An objection 
::::ct, i::; cons-ca::-:.::..;i- ~·a:'..3e.:: a6a:.1:st pro;:::sa:.s ~c-:: the introduction o:· 
philosophy into the classroom is that elementary and most middleschbol 
children do not possess the mental capacity for the abstract thinking 
which philosophy requires. The source of the objection can be traced to 
the classic works of Jean Piaget, and the argument adduc ed is t hat it 
is not until a child has reached the stage of formal operational thought 
(12-14 years) that he/she is capable of abstract, hypothetical thinkinb . 
In this section of the chapter I will firstly outline (i) the major 
tenets of the traditional Piagetian view pertaining to cognitive devel0p1~er.~ 
and the implications for education which it engenders, and (ii) the 
major objections to the inclusion of phi losophy in the schools which 
88 
89 
this view tends to support. Secondly, I will discuss the responses that 
are typically made to these objections and I will consider the strength 
of these replys with particular reference to the broader context of T. S. 
Kuhn ' s work. Finally, by exploring possible conceptualizations of 
cognitive development alternative to that of Piaget's, I conclude with 
the argument that the 'Piagetian objection ' to philosophy for children 
is not insuperable . 
Tne viability of a curriculum, however, is not entirely dependent 
upon the prospective students possessing this or that cognitive skill. 
Viability is also a f unction of their displaying a readiness to confront 
the types of issues that t he proposed course will raise . The second 
section of this chapter, therefore, is concerned with the viability of 
precollege philosophy in terms of the studeLt ' s readiness to confront 
extent of the young child's readiness to do philosophy. Gareth Matthews 
has made the most significant contribution to date in this field . His 
argument, which is the focus of this section, is based on an extensive 
selection of excerpts from children's speech. In short, his argument in 
favour of children's readiness for philosophy is that , upon close 
inspection, much of children ' s apparent whimsical dialogue actually 
overlays deeper philosophical puzzlement . 
~'he Cognitive Canacity of Precollebe Students 
Let us defer no longer and turn now to the first section of this 
chapter 1::y exa.":1ining the traditional Piagetian conception of cogniti ve 
development and the implications for education which it engenders. 
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Piaget's writings on cognitive development admit of a number of 
i nterpretations with respect to both the concept of a stage and the means 
of progression through them. The following account, however, represents 
that interpretation of his stage theory which has become the most 
entrenched in educational settings. First, Piaget advances three stages 
of cognitive development namely 1) preoperational, 2) concrete, and 
3) formed operational thought . Progression through them is sai d to occur 
as a res:il t o:.· !':'.atur ation . Second, the ages at which these stages are 
reached are generally set at 2, 5-7, and 12- 14 years respectively. And 
third, an indivi dual is held to be capable of only those forms of thinkin~ 
characteristic of the putative stage in which he is currently located and 
those prior to it . For example , while an individual at the stage of 
concrete operations is presumed to have access to patterns of thinking 
the individual is not capable of entertaining thoughts characteristic 
of the next stage, namely formal operations . The pervasiveness of this 
interpretation of Piaget and the extent of its acceptance have led many 
to assume that knowledge about children ' s thinking styles and capacities 
is a matter of age alone. It would seem as if the termi nology that once 
served to describe what at most might be the dominant modes of thinking 
in children at different ages , now serves to define the range of thought 
chi ldren are capable of . 
This view of cognitive development has a number of serious 
~mplications for the educator . For our present purposes , however , I 
have included only ~~ose which have given rise to the major objections 
in respect of intrc::.:.cing philosophy into the schools. 
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A major i~pl::ation of this view is that a child ' s education 
should be tailored~~ conform to the intellectual capacities consistent 
with the cognitive 2:~uctures which occur at each successive stage of 
logical develop~e~t. Inasmuch as progression through the three 
intellectual phases :s the natural outcome of an individual ' s overall 
cev e] op!r,ent , e :::.:.: a: :.:::-. i s subordinate to r.:aturation in terms o-:: its 
power to enhance CC€~itive growth . In other words , education can on this 
view facilitate ~~:-.e ·.~se of concepts already made accessible by the process 
of maturation, but:-: can do little, if anything, to advance an 
understanding of hi;~er order concepts. The suggestion her e is that it 
would be futile ~c =~~age students in activities that require thinking at 
even go so far as -: : propose, for example, that such an activity constitutes 
educational !'.".al;ra:-: ::.~e . In this case, the suggestion is that higher order 
concepts give r:se -:: confusion which itself in turn fosters the developnent 
of rote-learnlr.g s~~ategies and negative attitudes towards learning. 
A second i~;:..::ation of this view and one which to some extent 
offers an explanat:~~ for the paucity, in our recent past, of educational 
programs specifical:..:: designed to enhance thinking skills is the 
jnevitability c~ :~-:e:..lective-logical development . The point here is nc~ 
so much that it i s :~possible to push the child up the inclined plane of 
improved reasoning, :ut rather that it is not necessary s ince this 
progres sion wil: cc:·..:.~ its elf as a result of normal human development. 
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Philosophy for children is thus susceptible to indictment on both 
accounts: first, inasmuch as it requires facility with abstract concepts, 
it is considered unsuitable for children younger than 12-14 years; and 
second5 insofar as one of its major goals is the development of 
reasoning skills and reflective thought, its major source of 
justification becomes untenable. 
Those in favour of philosophy for children have responded to these 
criticisms in one of three ways: 1) attempting to identify weaknesses 
jn Piaget's theory (Gareth Matthews) ; 2) interpre~ing Piaget in such a 
way that his theory can be made to accommodate the possibility of 
philosophy for children (Hope J. Haas); 3) by ignoring the discrepancy 
between practicing philosophy for children on the one hand and thinking 
in Piagetian terms on the other. 
::.n what fo:..low s l snalJ. elucidate the weaknesses i:ihe:cen-c i:1 eac:1 
of these 3 responses. I shall then proceed to construct a framework in 
terms of which t he 'Piagetian objection ' can be more adequately met . 
Gareth Matthews 's criticism of the basis of Piaget ' s theoretical 
formulations is an example of the first type of response . In the course 
of formulating an argument concerning the appropriatness of philosophy 
for children, Matthews inveighs against Piaget ' s research techniques on 
the grounds that Piaget wittingly excluded from his data those unusual 
responses fro1!: chilcren ,,hicl! r.e himself called ' mere ror.tanc::..~. ; ' . 1 
1Gareth Matthews, Philosophy and the Young Child , 2nd ed . (Cambridi;e : 
Harvard University Press, 1930) , p.39 . 
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According to Matthews, it is the unusual response which is more likely 
t o be the result of honest r eflection and philosophic speculation and 
reasoning. Moreover, ·he adduces many examples of children ' s speech both 
from Piaget's work and his own research which lend convincing support to 
his claim. Matthews's point here is an i mportant one. However, 
insightful criticism of a theory upon which objections are based is not 
in and of itsel f sufficient reason to dispel those objections. Undermining 
the theory wil l of course undermi ne t he i~.mediate theoretical justification 
which the objections might have, but it remains to be seen whether an 
alternative account of cognitive develop::.ent conduc i ve t o t i e i ntroduction 
of philosophy in the school, can be provided. 
The second typical response to objections from the Piagetian 
framework is t o make interpretative manoeuv~es within that framework such 
and the training of thinking or reasoning in general . Hope Haas, for 
example, points out that in a more recent version of hi s t heory Piaget 
concedes t hat t he development of formal operations is not inev itable. 2 
While this claim makes possible the teaching of abstract thinking, it 
has no similar i mplications for those defined pat terns of t hought 
typical of the earl ier development al sequence. In other words, 
preoperational thought and concrete operational thought remain t he 
inevi table cons equences of the natural pr ocess of maturation . In or cer 
to acco.mnodate empirical fi ndi ngs f r om a variety of s ources which divt,lf;e 
2Hope J . Eaas, "The Ve.lu e of ' Ph i l osophy f or Childr en ' Hi thin t he 
Piagetian Fr ameworl\ ", ~.'.etaphilosonhy 7 ( 1) , 1976 , p . 73 . 
the capacity for formal thought in children much younger than 12- 14 years , 
a number of strategic theoretic-interpretative adjustments have been 
pos ited . The suggestion has been made , f or example, that the t r ansition 
between stages is much more gradual than previously believed, and that , 
for any given stage, the thinking patterns which it sustains may manifest 
themselves at different starting times and at different rates . Moreover , 
in some i nstances the sol ution has been to push back further to younger 
and younger chi2.c.ren the age at which formal thought is believed to 
surface. 
:finally , there is the response one finds in persons ·rho are at 
one and the same time committed to the Piagetian model as a result of 
their education and happy to teach philosophy and philosophical t hinking 
skills to youn5 :~ildren . Confronted wi th the theoretical dissonanc e, t rey 
may respond with a s houlder - shrug clair.iing t hat they persist with t he 
practice of philosophy because the children can manage it and do like it, 
and because they find t hat its practice facilitates children ' s learning 
in other areas. In the next breath , however,the s ame people continue their 
discourse drawing upon Piagetian ter ms and concepts . 
The second and third points made above are interesting , particularly 
in light of T. S . Kuhn ' s work on conceptual revolutions . The latter point , 
for example , see~s to be a typical case of treating as ' a pesky little 
that dee!: r.ot fit wi t::1 the co11te:::p0-:.· :1r:r -"t\"'').:,.:_ : ..... _ ..... ~-!. •• 
of choic e, that is, the paradigm which on account of its wide acceptance 
i1as becor.ie rit:;idl y er:!'bedded in everyday think ins . Sir.1ila.r ly , the 
phenomenon described in the second point above addresses the issue 
surrounding the unrej itting resistance encountered to challenging the 
existing dominant ~a~adi gm with altogether alternative conceptions . 
Rather, the typi cal course of action is to attempt to squeeze t he 
intractable data in~o the existing paradigm , or to stretch the fabric 
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of the theoreti cal ::-arnework in the hope of accommodat ing the discrepant 
data . Piaget 's s~a;e theory of cognitive development has been subjected 
extensively to both ~inds of treatment. However, theoretical moves of 
this kind are t he!::.s e:.. ·;es not unproblerr.atic. New issues concerning t he 
extent to which one can manipulate and reinterpret a theory and still 
claim to be •,;orki :-:.f ·~·:.. thin t he sar.:e theoret ical framewo!'k er::erge . '.·:i t r. 
~articul ar reference to Piaget' s work, for example, it becomes 
questionable whethe:- the concept of s tage remains viable given the 
theoretical manoeu~c."es mentioned above. Moreover, one might also contest 
~r c~itables t o continue ta 
think solely within -:he Piageti an framework . The point that needs to 
be stressed here is ~iat while manipulations of the Piagetian model may 
in the end produce a ~ormulation of stage theory which can embrace the 
divergent empirical :indings , this act i vity , should not preclude the 
pursuit of equally •:alid , if not more adequate , concept ual models . To 
the contrary, the exclusion of this pursuit from research design constitutes 
irresponsible theor i zing and an unnecessary stricture upon the range of 
p o ssible altern a -'::.ves. In respect of some of the claims Piaget r.iakes 
about cq;:li ti 'le st! .. ::-:ures , ~la.;e::.~ nar:es c. s imilar poi nt ,,:;er. :1e 
writes , " In certair. cases, a little reflection establishes that Piaget 's 
claim could only be :eopardized by logical count erargtL~ents , or by some 
superior alternative conceptualization of the whole domain - in other 
words , by some sort of nonempirical philosophical-theoretical type 
rebuttal . 11 3 
96 
It is not so much, however, that the rejection of Piaget ' s model 
is necessitated by these deliberations . Indeed , one should be willing 
to identify and develop the insights of a great thinker , particularly in 
those areas where the appropriate claims are wel l supported by evidence . 
Rather) wha~ is of u~~ost importance is the develop~ent of an openness 
to the weaknesses of the theory and to the idea that this model represents 
only one ct possibly ::ar.y cor.ceptualiza~ions of cog~itive development . 
The work of Susan Carey presented in her article "Are Children 
Fundamentally Different Kinds of Thinkers and Learners than Adults? " is 
apposite he~e. By way of investigating possible interpretations of what 
learners', she has arrived at five plausible conceptions of cognitive 
developmental change , four of which may be viewed as the beginnings of 
genuine al te:mati ves to the Piagetian framework. 
Let us begin with the interpretation most commonly aligned with 
the Piagetian position . Although Piaget ' s writings at times admit of 
interp.retations in keepi ng with one of the other four interpretations , 
the following in~erpretation has featured prominently in the literature 
3
,Toh!J :: . ?:!.avell , "Sta,:;e- related properties of cocnitive development" , 
Cocniti\"e :- :::·:cl':o l o,··,· 2, J..971 , p.~1lt6 . 
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but has also directei the course of research in developmental psychology. 
On this interpretat:.~:: "Children differ from adults with respect to the 
kinds of concepts t:_e~- can represent mentally, and/or with respect to 
the logical operati:~s that can be computed over their mental 
representations. ~::::er type of difference is called one of 
representational :'cr::at. 114 Developmental changes at this level represent 
the most funda.~enta: ~i fferences in thinking and learning possible and 
are considered "':::e !':s·..1lt of maturation. On this view , children are 
limited by these :'c!·::.ats in terms of the ways in which they can think, 
3.;,d these .:'~r ::.e.:.:s !a~·~ : !:e~selves in turn li!:1.i ted by the rate of 
maturation. ( 'E"lis ·::ew together with its educational implications was 
discussed earlier) . 
By contrast, :~e other four interpretations of 'fundamentally 
-· ~· ,. .... .;:.· .. -.5 
in terms of t he ac~~:sition of knowledge . Carey makes a further 
distinction , na."::e::.· :::at between ' donain general ' and 'domain specific ' 
knowledge . 1::-o~ai:: fe~eral ' knowledge is that knowledge whose 
acquisition is capa-::e of affecting thinking and learning across 
discipline boundaries . In this category Carey incorporates: ::.eta-
conceptual skills; ':oundational concepts ' , that i s , concepts which are 
putatively a part c: all theories; and, 'tools or ideas of wide application', 
for example, ~atie::.~::cal tools like calculus and logarithns . Domain 
specific knowl ec.ge, : :: the other hand , refers to knowing the conter.t o:· 
4s. Chip::!an , .: . ~~ ~al, and R. Glaser, Thinking and LearninF-: Skills ~ 
Vol . 2 , (C2~::bri:::;e : ~r:oaum Associates : forthcomint;) , "Are Children 
Funda:::ental ly :::::':'e :·: ,_~ Kinds of Thinkers and Learners than Adults':'" , 
by Susan Carey , p . l . 
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specific disciplines, for example, physics and chemistry. According 
to Carey, it is a truism that on this interpretation children are 
fundamentally di fferent thinkers and l ear ners - ' children are novices in 
a multitude of domains where adults are experts 1 • 5 
Whereas most explanations of cognitive development have been cast 
in terms of representational format or foundational concept change, Carey 
finds little, if any, support in the research for this rat ionale. As a 
result of reviewi ng much of the empirical work of both Piaget and 
contemporary devel opmental psychology in light of these five different 
conceptual frameworks, Carey concludes that perhaps the best explanation 
of cognitive development is to be made in terms of the acquisition of 
metaconceptual skills and/or domain specific knowledge. Car ey examines 
the evidence which is typically adduced to support Piaget ' s notion of 
major cognitive shifts in the child ' s logical structures which are said 
to be available between both preoperational and concrete operational 
thinking and concrete operational and formal operational thought. 
According to the tenets of the Piageti an model, children who have not made 
the shift from preoperational to concrete operational t hinking (occurring 
around age 6) have difficulty, f or example , with class inclusion simply 
because they cannot mentally represent the relation of class inclusion. 
In other words, prior to this shift it is held on the Piageti an conception 
that children do not have the cogni tive structures capabl e of representing 
the concept of class inclusion. Carey insists that t he research findings 
'leave no doubt that the young child differs from the adul t in his 
ability to impose incl usion hierarchies on new materials ... 16 • 
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However, she claims that explanations for the phenomenon , other than that 
of representational :ormat, are possible. Indeed, she suggests that they 
are most strongly incicated in light of ·the findings of Smith (1979) and 
Markman (1978). These findings show that the very young child (4 years) 
is capable of represe~ting inclusi on.7 Carey offers, (1) lack of 
specific knowledge a~out the language used in describing the classes, 
(2) lack of knowledge about classes themselves, and (3) lack of knowledge 
about the nature of ~t e class inclusion concept and how it works, as 
~~ree compelling alt ernative explanations. First of all, rather than 
the difficulties witt class inclusion being brought about by an inability 
to represent class inclusion, it may be that questions like 'Are there 
1;:i.0:re flowers than da:.s ies? 1 which are typically used in tests of class 
inclusion, violate Lcrmal everyday conversation maxims rendering t hem 
easily misunderstood. In other words, the difficulties may accrue as a 
by-product of obscure syntax. The meaning of the syntax in these cases 
stands in need of clarification, a feat older children have probably 
already accomplished. With respect to the significant effect of 
specific knowledge a~out the classes themselves on class inclusion task 
performance, the point is that a comprehensi ve knowledge of flowers and 
their hierarchies would greatly enhance performance. Instruction about the 
hierarchies of flowers, for example, is expected to improve performance in 
young children since most of them have had little instruction , either 
formal or informal, in this way of looking at the world. Carey cites her 
61· .d 01 • , 
7
~b·d 
.l l • ' 
p. 11. 
p . 13 . 
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own series of studies which show, for example, the important role that 
the acquisition of biological knowledge plays in the construction of the 
hierarchy of plants and animals, on one l evel , and living things on the 
8 
next. At one point the evidence even tempts her to suggest that ' the 
acquisition and reorganization of strictly domain spec i fic knowledge 
probably accounts for most of the cognitive differences between 3 year 
olds and adults . 9 Secondly , Carey believes that lack of metaconceptual 
awareness of the inclusion relation precludes the child 's appreciation 
of the necessity of various consequences of inclusion . In other words , 
knowledge about and an explanation of the dyna.."nics of the class inclusion 
r elation would serve to facilitate a correct understanding of the 
spec ific class i nclusion relation i n question. 
In conclusion then, cognitive develo.J?ment can be viewed primarily as 
a fi..nction of l ear::1ing ·..rhen it is explained in terms of the acquisition of 
knowledge, domajn- specific and/or metaconceptual , as opposed to changes 
at the level of representational format . 
What does all this ha·.-e to do with philosophy for children? The 
recognition that cognitive development might be conceived more adequately 
as a process of learning meets the objections to the introduction of 
philosophy into the classroom which were promoted on the basis of the 
traditional Piagetian view . First , insofar as children are no longer 
l i~ited in ter~s of their cognitive capacities by naturation , there is no 
8Ibid. , p .14 . 
9rbid ., p . 40 . 
101 
reason to suspect ~~at given the appropriate information they might not 
manifest and be prc:'icient in abstr act thinking at young ages . I n 
other words , the o·::·j ection made against philosophy for children procl aiming 
the inability of yc~r.g children to understand higher order concepts is not 
tenable on this lat~er view. Second, philosophy for children and indeed 
any program aiMed ~:rectl y at developing thinking skills is elevated to 
the status of a ~or:.~while , if not vital, educational practice . The view 
that cognitive gro~-:-:.:1 is predominantly a function of learning reinforces 
this conception . .. ; longer is education relegated to the role of providing 
practice in thinkic.~ capacities made accessible by virtue of maturation 
c'.~olle. .::nstea:5., c:-. :.~is latter view it can appropriate the role of 
initiating and deve:oping a variety of thinking styles in children . It 
need not be argued ~tat the Piagetian position could not be extended 
eventually to acco::.::~date this role of educat ion and the consequent 
·d.abili ~y of p:-.:.: c5::;:::y for children . '::.!'le point is rathe~ tr:at in li;'.:t c.:' 
the alternative co~:eptions to cognitive development shown here, the 
viability and i~pcr~~~ce of philosophy for children are at once ratifi ed . 
The Readi ness of ?recollege Students to Confront Issues in Philosouhy 
The foregoiLg discussion has provided an orientation to cognitive 
developmental theory which grants younger, prepubescent children the 
capacity to deal with abstract and higher- order, metaconceptual thinking . 
In so doing, it r.as ~rovided a framework i n terms of which precollege 
philosophy can be c::-:s i dered a viable curriculum endeavour si!lce youn[; 
children can partake in the type of thinking that the subject requires .. 
Precollege philosof:::: programs which involve the study of philosophy ' s 
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traditional problems, however, have an additional requirement to be met 
before their viability is fully attained . Viability in these cases is 
also a function of the children's readiness to deal with the subject- matter 
of the discipline; that is, a readiness to confront issues in metaphysics , 
epistemology, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion . 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned, therefore, with an examination 
of young children ' s preparedness for interactions with this type of 
subject- matter. 
Professor Gareth Matthews offers the most convincing evidence in 
support of the claim that precollege age children are ready for philosophy . 
Matthews has amassed an enormous selection of excerpts from children ' s 
dialogue which he believes indicates their propensity for philosophic 
speculation and reasoning . Even among very young children he has found 
dialogue which strongly suggests this tendency to wonder about problems 
typical of philosophy. He contends that the embarrasingly unanswerable 
questions which children are wont to ask are generally signs of philosophic 
puzzlement. While children's language is mostly naive and unsophisticated 
the claim is that the questions they ask are in essence the same as those 
of professional philosophers; indicative of a similar desire in children 
for meaning and understanding. Examples of the type of dialogue referred 
to here by Matthews occur frequently throughout the precollege philosophy 
literature. The following examples which are particularly notable have 
been drawn from Matthews book ' Philosophy and the Young Child ' and are 
included here to further illustrate his point . 
(a) Jordan ( 5 :.-:-s), going· to bed at eight one evening , asked, 
' If I go tc bed at eight and get up at seven in the 
morning, he·., do I really know that the littl e hand of tte clock has gone around only once? Do I have 
to stay up all night to watch it? If I look away even fo10 a short ti=e, maybe the small hand will go around twice .' 
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In this case Matthe~s points out how Jordan ' s puzzlement is inextricably 
bound up with proble::s of induction. In other words , the implicit 
concepts with which Jordan may here be concerned, have to do with what 
constitutes ' e!'loug:i evidence', 'enlarging the evidence base', and 'worry 
about how to extra;c:ate justifiably from observed periods to unobserved 
11 
ones'. 
(b) A l ittle gi~: of nine asked: 'Daddy, . is there really God?' The father a::swered that it wasn't very certain; to which 
the child re~orted: ' There must be really , because he has 
a name! 112 
Matthews bring£ Ber~~and Russell ' s argument as applied to Romulus to bear 
upon this pro":):'..e:: . 
i If 'Romu:~s ' is a name, there exists an entity named Romulus . (A name has got to name something or it is 
not a na.::e) 
ii There exis~s no entity named Romulus 
iii Romulus is not a name 
And now: 
iv If God is a name , there exists an entity named God 
v God is a name 
vi There exists an entity named God 
lOMatthews, Philos:;c~v and the Young Child, p.2. 
11Ibid., 
12Ib .d l . , 
pp . 3-4 . 
p . 30 . 
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He explains that the principle needed to justify i and iv is debatable , 
the debat e extending as far back as the pre-Socratic phil osophers to 
~ontempor ary discussion of 'free logics ' in which ' empty names ' are 
allowed . In thi s way, he reveals the extent to which a child ' s reasoning 
may be philosophically based and cor respondingly admit of philosophical 
elaboration. Matthews argues that to the extent that children ' s questions 
are phi l osophical , they deserve the appropri ate respect and sensitivity 
of' :response that. philosophically trained t eachers can give them . Anc, 
similarly, in both: 
and 
(c) Ian (6 yrs) found to his chagrin that the three 
children of hi s parent ' s friends monopolized the 
television; they kept him from watching his 
favour i te programme. 'Mother', he asked in 
f rustration , ' why is it better for three people to 
be selfish than for one? 113 
(d) Some question of fact arose between James and his 
father , and James said , ' I know it is !' His father 
replied, ' But you mi ght be wrong !' Denis (4 yrs 
7 mths) then joined in saying , ' But if he knows, 
he can't be wrong ! Thinking's sometimes wrong , but 
knowing ' s always right ! 1 14 
he showed that the child ' s thinking is susceptible of further philosophic 
discussion, teasing out an appropriate level, considerations such as the 
principle of utility and the theory of knowledge , respectively . An 
example drawn from my own teaching experience with a ,class of 6 year olds 
may also be ~pposite . I was in the midst of a lesson on the solar system 
when two children in the class spontaneously brought forward :for consic.erntion 
the following example of ,philosophical questioning . 
13Ibid . , p . 28 . 
11
~Ibid ., p . 27 . 
Child 1: 
Child 2: 
Child 3: 
'Who made the world? ' 
'Oh, you know. God did.' 
' Yes, but who made God? ' 
105 
Matthews' contention is not that every piece of dialogue which 
appears philosophically rich is necessarily a reflection of genuine 
philosophic puzzlement . Moreover, he does not suggest that every child 
has a predisposition for this particular form of wonder . His point is 
rather that s ince many children display characteristics of phi losophical 
puzzlement , at 2.east some of which mi ght be genuine philosophical 
deliberation, then .these questions and speculations deserve respect and 
consideration. 
In favour of actually encouraging ' the impulse to philosophize ', 
as he calls it , Matthews argues in the following way : 
(i) Some children naturally do philosophy 
(ii) Some c::ildren nat-u!'ally <io arthnusic e1;c. 
(iii) Children' s art/music impul ses are encouraged (not 
condescended to) 
therefore, 
(iv) Children ' s philosophic impulses should be encouraged (and not condescended to)l5 
The strength of his argument here , however , depends largely on the exte~t 
to which (i) is ~rue. Apart from the selections of childr en 's dialogue 
Matthew has brought forward in suppor t of this claim, there is an ever 
increasing body of support t o be found in Thi nking : The Journal of 
Philosophy for Children . Throughout this journal many examples of nc~~~l 
l5 Gareth B. :.:at thews , ''On Talkine Philosophy with C:iildren" , Soy::i.l 
I nstit·1te of P!: ilosop~v Lectures , 1975- 1976 , p . 47 . 
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class dialogues in h~ich philosophical issues are being discussed with 
both elementary and ~iddleschool children are presented. Here again, 
the dialogues serve to reveal the extent to which many children are 
very interested in e~d capable of delving into the classical problems 
of philosophy. For example , in Volume 2(1) a very engaging transcript 
of a dialogue from ~:~th graders discussing the epistemological questions 
of evidence, knowlec.ge and truth clearly indicates the interest level and 
capabi lity o~ this a~e group t o grapple with such issues. (See Appendix 
4 for a copy of this transcript. ) 
j1 s::.::!ilar 1:.::-.-:: of argu."!'lent in f avour of er:couraging pni:'.. oso;,hic 
thinki ng suggests t:.at because we underestimate children ' s readiness for 
philosophy, we do t t en less than educational justice. Drawing from t he 
work of R.D . Laing a""d his thesis that chil dren and adults often live up 
. . . 
~--=-::-.e:. :.~~ <""\ ·" - ' ... ".' •• .._. ______ .... ·-
as incapable of phi!osophic deliberation , we are ensuring that they will 
16 act that way . The i~plied recommendation on both account s that will 
ensure the fair trea~nent of children in respect of their philosophic 
propensities, is the adoption of a more open and positive attitude 
towards their capabilities . Instead of approaching children with 
expectations which a priori restrict the extent of t heir .philosophical 
inquisitiveness and understanding , the recommendation is for an 
environ.ment which a ~~ords the opportunity for both exploration and 
cons iderat ion of the children ' s ideas . 
. 
16
~1atthew Lipman , ,.?hilosophy f or Children", ~-letaPhilosonh\· 7 ( 1 ) , 
1976, p. 25. 
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I s the encouragement of philosophical thinking and/or the 
encouragement of a confrontation with philosophic issues potentially 
harmful to children? It is not unreasonable to anticipate the following 
kinds of objection to philosophy for chi ldren : first, the philosophic 
mode of thought is unproduct ive; and second, the deeper philosophical 
issues are disturbing to children insof ar as they disrupt established 
conceptions of reality , etc. In respect of these concerns Matthews 
advances an ir.t e:!:'est i ng viewpoi nt , one that could be developed to 
provide a compelling argument in favour of doing philosophy with 
cl:ildren . :.:a'~~::ews proposes that the ea.rly appearance of philosoP.hic 
tendencies in children indicates that the search for meaning and 
understanding which instigates philosophic inquiry is not the exclusive 
prerogative of adulthood. 17 Rather he view3 philos~phyas being more 
~·-H: (· to the · :.:e of t :r..e !":ir:d :.::~::i 
Matthews , childrens' philosophical questioning is an expression of the 
same i mpulse that brings adults to philosophy, and therefore, toe search 
for philosophic meaning is an important , if not necessary, function of 
the mind. The argument surfacing h ere and one which admits of further 
elaboration is t hat a healthy intellectual progression through chil dhood 
is as much dependent on philosophic discovery as it is upon discoveries 
about the more empirically orientated body of knowledge . If the 
argument were correct then the appropriate educational response , would 
oe one ,,:iich encour aged philosophi ca l inquiry at least to ,:.he s 3.;::e extc::t 
as those curriculum subjects which sponsor definite , readymade ans wers . 
17 Matt he\,S , 11':alking Philosophy with Children", p . Lf1 . 
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The issue of readiness with regard to children and philosophy 
is not yet fully articulate. In the absence of theoretical and empirical 
elaboration, however , it seems reasonable to conclude from the evidence 
to date that many children have some sort of readiness of philosophic 
inquiry . Matthews has been a forerunner in this field of investigation 
and his findings provide a firm basis for arguing in favour of children's 
r eadiness for philosophy. Two problems do emerge , however , with his 
particular line of research ; probler.is whose resolution would serve t0 
ensure fur ther progress in the field. The first relates to the 
assess~ent of readines s, the second to i~dividual differences in 
philosophic propensity . 
(i) Unt i l now philosophic readiness has been deter mined on the 
basis of the content of children ' s everyday and classroom dialogues . That 
deliberation in their di alogues. This method of determination, however , 
has two major limitations . On the one hand , it does not provide a means 
for assessing the extent to which the apparent philosophic display 
characterizes truly philosophic deliberation as opposed to mere childhood 
whimsy. On the other hand , it is an inadequate method for maki ng an 
assessment about philosophic readiness in children who do not make any 
such overt displays . It may be that for this small percentage of 
children there is no predisposition for philosophic inquiry, that is , no 
reaciiness for philosophy . Other explanations can be provided , however , 
which equally well account for this absence of overt philosophic displ:iy . 
The chil.i mi bht 1Je , for example , char a.cteristically quiet and unspoken . 
Progress in this field of research is, therefore, very much dependent 
upon the development of techniques more comprehensive in their 
assessment of philosophic readiness . 
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(ii) The problem of individual differences in philosophic 
readiness is twofold. First there is -che problem related to teaching a 
group of children, some of whom display a readiness and some who don 't. 
Second, there is the problem of individual differences in actual areas 
of philosophic interest. For example, evidence of interest in 
metaphysical issues does not guarantee an interest in or readiness for 
issues in the philosophy of science. 
The problem concerning teaching those with a readiness for the 
subject and those without .is not a problem peculiar to the subject of 
philosophy. Without meaning to appear terse, the most obvious solution 
would see!':l to involve the division cf the group fo:- teaching practice . 
The problem of heterogenous interest a reas, however, is more complex and 
deserves more attention . It is not the aim of this chapter to elaborate 
upon appropriate teaching strategies . Rather , I will conclude by 
suggesting a direction in which these programs might best proceed . 
Ideally, the teacher would assess each child for interest areas 
and degree of philosophic curiosity . Given that the teacher was 
sensitive to philosophic . issues and their ramifi cations then, a 
heterogenous group should benefit from most philosophic inquiry . In 
other words, the success of a philosophy program see~s very much 
dependent upon the teachers ab i lity to select and present those parts of 
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a philosophy progran ~ost suited to his/her students . It is the 
teachers who are fa:::i l iar with their students, and it is within their 
responsibility to tai:!..or a program to the pupils ' needs. It seems 
unrealistic to expect a program to cater to so many different needs 
particularly .:ithou-: specific knowledge of what they are. Rather , a 
more generally struc~~red program with specific suggestions for 
cateri ng to differe~t interest areas seems more appropriate. 
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A P P E N D I X 1 
AN OUTLINE OF THE PHILOSOPHY FOR 
CHILDREN CURRICULUM 
Figure lA: Curriculum Outline Through Grades K- 12 . 
(Adapted from Fig.1 ., p.54, "Philosophy in the Classroom") 
K- 2 3-4 5-6 
General Philosophical Foundations 
Language 
Aquisition 
Kio 
and 
Gus 
Language 
Aquisition 
Pixie 
Aquisition 
of Formal 
& Informal 
Logic 
Harry 
6 10 
Elementary Philosophical 
Specialization 
Lisa 
Suki 
:fark 
11-12 
Advanced 
Philosophical 
Specialization 
Ethics 
Epistemology 
Metaphysi~s 
Aesthetic.3 
The following grade by grade description of the Philosophy for 
Children curriculum has been constructed from extracts taken from the book 
'Philosophy in the Classroom' and a series of course description leaflets 
published at IAPC, Montclair State College . 
I. The Early Childhood Curriculum 
( i ) Program: Reasoning About rature 
Grade Range: K- 5 
Novel: Kio and Gus 
Manual : Wondering at the World 
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Kio and Gus: Kio visits his grandparents ' farm and becomes friendly with 
Gus, who lives with her family not far away. The novel consists 
largely of conversations . The children are sensitive to language 
ar.d ideas as well as to the animals, people and things in the world 
around them . Among the contrasting concepts they wonder about are 
make-believe and real ity, fear and courage, saying and doing, and 
truth and beauty . 
As a result of the intense interest shown by Kio and Gus in 
animals, in space and time, and in many other aspects of nature, 
the book se!··.res in the prograr.i as an introduction to science , as 
well as the relationship between language and the world . 
Wondering at r.1· .. e ~-."orld : The stress is on language acquisition with 
particular attention to t he forms of reasoning implicit in children ' s 
everyday conversation . Also, there is an emphasis on intensification 
of perceptual awareness , sharing of perspectives through dialogue, 
classification and distinction , and reasoning about feeling . 
(ii) Program : Reasoning About Language 
Grade Range: K- 5 
Novel : Pixie 
Manual : Looking for Meaning 
Pixie : Among the goals of the Pixie program are the following : 
- to prepare children to study Harry Stottlemeier . Discovery in 
the following year of philosophy by improving those inquiry 
skills which make for success when doing the Harry program. 
- to stress r.!eaning acquisition and reading comprehension . 
- to help students develop facil ity in handling class and family 
relationships , as well as rules, reasons and excuses, the Pixie 
course concentrates upon strengthening t he awareness of 
relationships (logical, social, familial, aesthetic , causal , 
part--whole, ::-.athematical, etc. ) , as well as the competence in 
dealing with such relationships . 
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Looking for ~1eaning : Continues the emphases of Kio and Gus paying 
greater atter.t ion to semantical and syntactical structures, such 
as ambiguity, and abstract philosophical notions such as causality , 
space, number , person, class, group. 
II. 7he Curricu:·~:: for the Middle- School 
(i) Program : 
:J.rad.e 3&.r:ge : 
Novel : 
Manual 
=~sic Reasoning Skills 
.., 
- - r 
~arr y Stot tlemeier ' s Discovery 
?hilosophical Inquiry 
Harry : Harry is the ~asic text in the middleschool program in philosophy 
stress is on -::-:e acquisition of formal and informal logic . The 
novel offers a model of dialogue both the children with one another 
and with adu:~s . Its story is set within a classroom of children 
who begin to thi nk about thinking , and in the process discover 
principles o: reasoning . They also discover, in the events that 
follow both within and outside the classroom, that they can apply 
their thinking effectively to situations in real life . The story 
is also a teaching model , it points out the value of inquiry, 
encourages ~te development of alternative modes of thought and 
imagination, and suggests how children can learn profitably from 
one another. Further, it sketches what it might be like to live 
and po.::.·ticir:.:: -::e in o. sr.-,all communi t:)' whe1·e the cni ld::.·e!1 r.a,,e t:-.e .:.:: 
own interests , yet respect each other as people and are capable 
at times of enfaging in cooperative inquiry for no other reason 
than the sa.tis:'action of doin5 so . 
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(ii) Program: Reasoning in Ethics 
Grade Range : 6-12 
Novel : Lisa 
Manual ; Ethical Inquiry 
Lisa : Lisa is a sequel to Harry Stottlemeier ' s Discovery and focuses 
upon ethical and social issues such as fairness, naturalness, 
lying and truth-telling, a.nd the nature of roles and standards. 
Other i ssues explored include the rights of children, j ob and sex 
(lj_scrimi nation , · and antmal r i ghts . :!.",isa is concerned with the 
interrelat ionship of logic and mor ality . The curriculum is 
designed t o help student s establish good reasons in justifying 
t heir beliefs a s well a s in j ustifying cert ain departures ::'ro!l1 
normal patterns of conduct. 
(iii) Program: Reasoning in Language Arts 
Grade Range 6-12 
~fovel: 8;;ki 
1,:anual : ·..:ri t i ng : How and ~ .. ~:t 
Suki: Suki is a novel about the same group of children who are now 
freshmen in hi gh school. Faced with assignments in writing poetry 
and prose, Harry protests that he cannot write at all . The novel 
explores the ways in which this writer's bloc is dealt with and 
overcome. At t he same time, it considers such underlying issues 
as experience and meaning, criteria f or the assessment of writinb , 
relationship between thinking and writing, the nature of definition, 
and the distinction between craft and art. 
Writing ; . How and \\Thy: concent r a tes on the ;.rr i tin~; of poet r y, 
with numerous exercises and activities. Among other t hings , t he 
manual is an impressive anthology of hundreds of poems by and for 
children . 
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(iv) Program; Reasoning in Social Studies 
Grade Range; 6-12 
Novel: Mark 
Manual: Social Inquiry 
Mark: The fictional characters i n Mark are now high school sophmores. One 
of ther.1~ ~;ark is accused of vandalism. In an effort to ascertain 
wbo is guilty Mark's class find themselves impelled to inquire 
into a nlL~ber of general social issues such as t he function of law, 
the nati.;.~·e of bureaucracy ~ the role of crime in modern society , the 
freedom of the individual, and alternative conceptions of justice . 
Again tte ~anual~ puts these and many other concepts into practice 
throug:-: c lassroom acti vities and exercises. 
III. The Curriculum for the High School 
P:rogra:::: Advanced Philosophical Spe~ializations 
This curriculum is not yet developed . It is planned , however, to 
consist of a number of approaches each representing a more advanced 
area of philosophical specialization. Five separate novels, each 
with its own manual , is to be construct ed i n the areas of ethics, 
epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and logic . Each of these 
will carry on and reinforce the thinking skills and the techniques 
of applying such skills t hat had been developed in previous 
experience to philosophy f or children. 
(i) 
A P P E N D I X 2 
BOOKS AND OTHER ~1ATERIALS USEFUL FOR THE TEACHING 
OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY 
Literature reconunended by Gar~th ~1atthews 
I n a coltlr."n entitled ' Thinking in Stories ' which appears regularly 
in 'Thinking: Tie Journal of Philosophy for Children', Professor 
Matthew~ describes the phil osophical content of certain children ' s books . 
'11he literature ~e has i dentified to da-.:.e as be:.ng philosophically rich 
includes: 
Frog and Toad Toge~her 
Albert 's Toothache 
Hildili d ' s Ni ght 
Tom ' s Midnight Qarden 
Leese Webster 
~:.e ?.eal Thief 
The Upside- Down Cat 
Morris the Moose 
Wally ' s Stories 
Raging Robots and 
Unruly Uncles 
by 
by 
by 
by 
by 
by 
':y 
by 
by 
by 
by 
Arnold Label 
Barbara ·.:i lliams 
Cheli Duran Ryan 
Phillipa Pearse 
Ursula K. LeGuin 
~'1illia::i Steig 
Elizabeth Parsons 
B. Wi seman 
Vivian Gussin Paleg 
~largaret. }~ahy 
An exampl e of the type of analysis he provides is as follows : 
In Thinking, Vol.1(1) , he discusses bri efly Arnold Label ' s stories , 
drawing attention particularly to a passage in one of these stories 
called ' Cookies ' . Here Frog and Toad are discussing their will power 
in respect of resisting freshly baked cookies . :.:atthews writes : 
The notion of wi ll , and the associated r.otion of will power , 
are philosophically both vexed and vexjng . Some of the 
vexations have to do wi th the idea of determinis~ and ~hether deter!:ii!"lis::: is compatit::.e ,,:i :.h :'::.·ee ,dll . 3t.it 0t :1e~·s have t,~ 
J20 
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do with the idea of weakness of will , incontinence (akrasia ) 
- lack of will power . Frog says that will power is ' trying 
hard not to do something you really want to do '. There is 
something very puzzling about the i dea of trying not to do 
what you really want to do. If you really want to do it , you 
won ' t really try not to . On the other hand, if you really 
try not to, it will be because you want not to do it . What 
Frog (and we) describe as lack of will power begins to look 
l ike a case of conflicting desires . Toad wants to stop; but 
also (and even more strongly) he wants to continue to eat 
cookies . ... etc . 
Arnold Label ' s gentle and loving ~ockery of Frog and Toad invites 
us 'to refl ect upon the phenomenon of weakness of will ~nd to join 
philosophers from Aristotle (see Book VII of his Nicomachean Ethi cs) to 
the present iP- ~rying to understand it. :-ne phenomenon is as familia~ 
as it is difficult to be clear about . 
(j_i) 5ecommended Texts for Teaching High School Philosouhv 
teaching high school philosophy : the classical approach which centred 
on carefully pre- selected reading ; the ' issues ' approach which was 
structured around topics with readings chosen for their i llumination of 
the problem more than for their inherent or classical contribution to 
philosophy; li:e- style auproaches which explored alternative life styles 
based on major philosophical positions; and , t he ' open-process ' ap oach 
r which sought to develop altogether inductively, letting topics and 
readings be determined by students either from their own suggest io or 
from their choice of material suggested by the instructor . 
Examples of books used for: 
:::ntrd.'.lc-:ion 'to ?::ilosopby 
' Invitation to Philosophy ' , Honer and Hunt (Wadsworth) , C 
' Learning to Phi losophicize ' , E.rt. En'lmet (Pelican) , Chapt 
1 
Classical Philosophy 
Aristotle: Ethics , Books I and II 
Descartes: selection from Meditations 
Dostoevsky to Sartre : selections on existentialism 
• 
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Plato: Crito, Apology, and the story of the cave from the Republic 
Philosophy of Science 
'The Structure of Science ', E. i-Iagel (Harcourt), Chapter 1 : Science 
and Common Sense 
'Naturalism ' , A. Danto 
r1•ne Encyc:.opedeia of Pr:.i::..osophy 
'Science as an Adventure of the Human Spirit ' 
Selectior.s from Whitehead, Bror,mowski and W. \ieaver 
Phil osophy of Religion 
' The Lost Dimension of Religion ' , Paul Tillich 
'Man's Search for Meaning ' , Victor Frankl 
F'ilm : 'Hight and Fog ' (:.:ass :-Iedia ::inistries) 
Logic 
'Introduction to Logic ', Irving Copi 
In addition, the following were used by two or more teachers in the program: 
Freud: The Future of an Illusion 
Fromm: Marx's Concept of Man 
Hesse : Siddartha 
Kaplan : The New World of Philosophy 
Kaufmann: Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre 
Malcolm X: Autobiography 
~i ll , J . S .: On Liberty 
Ruby, Lionel: The Art of ::aking Sense 
B. Philosophy Thr ough Literature 
-program developed by Ms A. Merrington . 
high school philosophy 
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Course 'outline : Introduction - an under standing of what is meant 
by philosophy 
·The Nature of the Mind 
Appear ance and Reality 
Free Will vs Determinism 
Moral Proof and Principles, Eth_ics 
The Reasoning Pr ocess - Informal Logic 
'i'he Quest - the universal search for answers and 
uni ty 
Examples of literature used in the course : 
On the i:ature of the :-!ind 
1 Zen a!'lc 1,he Art of :.:otorcycle ~iding', Pirsig , Chs . 7 and 14 . 
'Faith and the Good Thing' , Johnson and Charles 
' The Celestial Railroad ', Hawthor ne: The Birthmark , Rappacini ' s 
:aughter 
' 'l'he i,:artian Chronicles ' , Bradbur y 
' Brave Hew World' , Huxley 
On Appearance and Reali t y 
Classical works : 
Plato ' s concepts as shown in ' the Cave ' and ' the Meno ' 
Descarte ' s theories revealed in excerpts from the 'Medit ations' 
Statement of the problem by B. Russell 
Literature : 
' The Turn of the Screw ', Henry James 
'Alice in Wonderland ' and ' Through the Looking Glass ', Lewis Carroll 
'The Trial ' , Kafka 
'Steppenwolf ' , Hesse 
'The Te~pest ', Shakespeare 
' The Mysterio~s Stranger' 
'The Man who Corrupted Hadleyburg' , Twain 
(iii) Programs for ~eaching Logic and Critical Thinking in Precollege 
Education 
Schools and colleges are using many different methods to teach 
thinking skills . Tte following programs, based on various educational 
philosophies, ha•:e received considerable attention. 
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r::.:l1e Struc-:":!:'e ::.:~ the I ntellect ?rogram : this approach developed. by 
J.P. Gui lford, has t:!:'oken intelligence into 120 discrete skills , 26 of 
which are said ~c ~e critical to success in school. Thousands of 
s epa:.Aate lessor.s ca,.-e ·:::ieen created to teach the skills. The program ' s 
headquarters is t~e 3.J.I . Institute in El Segundo, California . 
The Strategic ~easoning Approach : is based on the ideas of the late 
Albert Upton. ~~is a~?roach concentrates upon six problem-solving 
sec_;_'..:.er:cj_ng , see:.:.; :::-e~ationslnps a:::l synthesizir,.5 . :::xercisea ·..;.::relat.;;l: 
to school are used , and the principles are transferred to classroom 
applications and the~ to life situations . Innovative Sciences in Stamford, 
Conneti-::.ut markets t~e lessons . 
The Educatior.a~ Enrichment Program : was developed by Reuven 
Feverstein and is geared to low achievers . It attempts to tap- the intrinsic 
motivation to learn , using problem-solving tasks to bring out abi l ities t hat 
can be applied to sc~ool work. Many of the exercises require little 
reading so that all ciildren can address the task. Curricultun Development 
Associates in Washington distributes the mat erials and trains the teachers . 
The Ed,,ayc. c.e 3ono Lateral Thinking Approach: Mr de Bono ' s theory, 
disseminated :fr c:7: i1:2 :1.eadquarters in London, inc ludes breakinG oi..;.t. o :.· 
traditiona l thinking patterns by trying to devise new ways of l ooking at 
problems . 
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Other programs include : 
The Product ive Thinking Program : a course in learning to think 
by Covington , ~.1.v ., Crutchfield, R.S ., Davies , L. and Olton, R.M. Charles 
E. Merril Publishing Co., Col ombo, Ohio. 1974 
Critical Thinking: with children's workbook and teacher's guide, 
by Anita Harnadek . ;,liddleschool program . :-lid west Pu.bl ishi ng? Pacific 
Grove, California . 1980 . 
Snowflakes and Clouds : Reading , Thinking and Reasoning Skills 
Program by Dorr Barnes , and Burgdorf, A. and Wenok, L.S. Stock and Vaughn 
Co . , Austin , Texas. 1975. 
Mathematical Reasoning: for Junior High by Anita Harnadek , Midwest 
'4..ir,J ishers, :.:ic::i~a:1 , l9'72 . 
A P P E N D I X 3 
TH::::;:--:ING SKILLS Ai'.iD THE PHILOSOPHY FOR 
CHILDREN PROGRAM 
I n a recent ; aper, Professor Lipman list s thirt y thinking skills 
supposedly taught c~· ~he Philosophy for Children Program . He claims 
that t he list i s net exhaustive , and f or each skill he also cites an 
example er exercise :~volving the use of that skill . The examples are 
taken i'!'o::-. :.::e i:1s-:::-·..:.::~ion manuals whici1 accorr.pany t:1em . For t he purposes 
of this thes i s , I i:a::e chosen to include only t he list of thinking skills . 
For further i:i:o~~~-=:~n : see ' Th:nking Skills Fostered by Philosophy fc!' 
Ci1ildren', ~nfubl::.s::.e:: paper by :l';atthew Lipman , f.lontclair State College , 
N .J . , 1983 . 
The thinking skills he cites in this paper include the following : 
- fo r!:'.ul a ti:-,f concepts precisely 
- l'orwulatir.f :::ause- effect relationships 
making i r.:.:eiiate inferences from a single premise 
- drawing s:,,·: .:..::)gistic inferences from two premises 
- knowi ng ele~entary rules of standardization 
- knowin& t::e !'ules governing ordinal and relational logic 
- recognizing consistencies and contradiction 
- drawi ng in~erences from conditional syllogisms in propositional 
logic 
- formulatin; questions 
- identifying underlying asswnptions 
- grouping pa::-t- whole and whole- part connections 
.• }c1c·,rin:; ·,:::-2:·. to n.void, tolerate- or utilize ar.1biGui.ties 
- recognizin~ vague wor ds 
- taking rele·::rnt considerations into account 
- recot:;!1izi::c -:::e interdependence o!' ends and means 
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- recognizing informal fallacies 
- operationalizing concepts 
- giving reasons 
- recognizing the contextual nature of truth and falsity 
- making distinctions 
- making connections 
- working with analogies 
- discovering alternatives 
- constructing hypotheses 
- analyzi ng values 
- instantiating 
- constructing definitions f or familiar words 
.. j dentifying and using c:ri teria 
- taking differences of perspective into account 
A P P E N D I X 4 
fIFTH- GRADERS DISCUSS EVIDENCE , 
KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH 
Fifth- graders discuss Evidence, Knowledge and Truth - a transcript 
made by Ronald Reed and published in Thinking, 1980, 2(1) 68 71 
- ' pp . - . 
Firs t time on tape - 4-5 minutes 
giggling. 
Ron 
Shaun 
Ron 
Wendy 
Beth 
Ron 
Craig 
Ron 
Gail 
Ron 
- Let's talk about some of 
the words that have come up 
in previous classes. Words 
like "certainty, 
evidence " 
- "Proof." 
- "Proof." 
- "Knowledge ." 
- "Belief." 
- "Knowledge, be lief." 
- "Convince. " 
- And "convince." I didn't 
think we'd come up with 
that many. Let's stay with 
these. These are 
important words that have 
come up recently in our 
discussions. These words 
might stand a l ittle more 
definition. 
- Who's got the dictionary. 
[Pause] I got it. 
- Wait. Let's see what 
definitions, what relations 
among words we can come up 
with. 
Beth - You want to be wrong . 
LAUGHTER 
Ron 
should be able t o unpack 
. . . , to say what we mean 
when we use these terms. 
Beth - You always take the hard way. 
Ron - I ' m sorry (jokingly). It 
will be fun. 
Shaun - Hey, recorder How y' doing . 
Ron - O.K., how about "proof" . 
Holly - What ;:ibout "proof". 
Ron - Can I prove to you someth ing 
tha t is false. Can I prove 
t o you 2 + 2 = 5. 
Uolly - Yo u can ? rove it, but I 
wouldn 't believe it because 
I know it's not true. 
Beth - But then you wouldn't be 
proving it. I mean I ' d know 
it was false and you ' d know 
it was false and it wouldn't 
be a proof. 
Holly - So if we bo th knew it was 
false then it would not be 
proved. 
Mi tch - What about if you were proving 
it to ten people and make 
believe some people knew it 
was true and some people knew 
it was false. Then could yo~ 
prove it? 
Beth If some people knew it was 
true . .. 
- No, I just want to find out 
what we mean when we use Ron - Isn't that a di fferen t case . 
the terms. These are 
ordinary words, right? We 
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Weren ' t we talking about it 
being false . 
Mitch 
Ron 
Mitch 
Ron 
Mitch 
Ron 
Beth 
PAUSE 
Ron 
Beth 
Ron 
Beth 
PAUSE 
Ron 
Beth 
Ron 
PAUSE 
- Right. It is false for some 
people, but it is true for 
other people. 
- Remember the discussion 
we had on contradiction. A 
sentence can 't be both true 
and false at the same time. 
2 + 2 = 4 is either true or 
false. Can't be both, right? 
- Right. 
- Right. You did agree before. 
You can change your mind if 
you want. 
- O.K. What about if If 
. .. what Beth said was 
some thing ... Be th said 
something would not be a 
proof because I know it was 
false and you know it was 
fals e. 
- Beth is saying ... 
- ... that you can't prove 
something that everybody 
knows is false . ·Or really 
you can't prove something 
that is false. 
- That's a pre t ty big chaP.g~ , 
an addition you made there? 
No? 
- What. 
- Well first you said you 
can't prove something that 
everybody knows is false. 
Then you said you can ' t 
prove something that simply 
is false. Whether 
people know its true or 
false doesn't seem to 
matter then . 
- O.K. 
- Well, what do you want to 
say now. 
- The second one . I t doesn't 
matte r whethe r anybody 
knows or not. 
- O.K. Anybody e lse have 
anything to say. 
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Ron - I bet there's a lot more 
we could say about proof. 
But maybe we have enough 
to begin comparing things. 
If you prove something, 
what you prove must be 
true. Right. 
SERIES OF NODS, SMILES ETC . 
As I remember it. 
Ron - Is there any difference 
between evidence and 
proof. 
EVERYBODY SAYS NO. 
Ron - Do you ever get nervous 
when everybody agrees. Or 
when something seems 
obvious. When you think 
you have the right answer 
right away. PAUSE Th ink 
about Harry. He though t 
he had the answer in Ch.l . 
Poor Harry is still looking. 
It's now what, Ch . 7, Ch.8? 
You guys agreeing so quick 
makes me nervous . 
WHAT SEEMS TO BE A UNIVERSAL NO 
FOLLOWED BY HUCH I..AUGHTER . A kird 
o~ joke is b~i~; ~lay~~ h~~2. : 
suspect. 
Ron - What is . . . Give me some 
examples of evidence. 
Stacy - I have evidence that this 
glass, that someone, that 
Craig 
Gail 
}{itch 
Shaun 
Ron 
Shaun 
Jim drank from this glass. 
- You didn't see him. 
- She doesn't have to s ee 
him. She could know from 
other stuff. 
- Like his fingerprints on 
the glass. 
- Or if somebody else saw him. 
An eyewitness . 
- Anything else ~ Another 
example of "having evide nce 
for." 
- I have proof f0r and I have 
evidence for this: The 
Dodgers will win the 
pennant. 
Ron - Aw, you can ' t have proof for 
that. Obviously, the 
Dodgers won't win. Only 
kidding. Only kidding . But 
seriously we agreed that 
you can ' t have proof for 
something that is false. 
Right? So you can ' t prove 
that the Dodgers will win 
if in fact, they lose. I 
wonder, also, if you could 
prove that the Dodgers will 
win even if the Dodgers do 
win . I mean could I prove 
it now? Anybody? 
NO RESPONSE . 
Ron - We said that belief, I mean, 
we said that proof gives you 
a kind of guarantee of truth . 
Now, say, I pick up this 
glass and I say "Jim used 
this glass to have a drink 
of water because the glass 
is\ full now and Jim's 
fingerprints are on the 
glass." Two questions (1) 
Do we have evide nce to 
support our claim that Jim 
drank wate r from the glass. 
Stacy - We can't say for sure that 
Jim had the glass because 
his fingerprints 
Craig - His fingerprints are on the 
glass. 
Jim - Somebody else could have 
PAl'SE 
put my fingerprints on the 
glass. They could have a 
machine that steals 
fingerprints, comes and 
gets them in the middle of 
the night. Or like a 
camera. Takes a picture of 
your fingerprints and puts 
them on the glass. 
Ron - You're saying it's possible 
to sort of forge 
fingerprints. Counterfe it 
finge rpr ints . 
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Jim - Yeah. 
CONVERSATION VERY LOUD, HARD TO 
MAKE OUT ON TAPE. 
Six minutes of discussion and 
anecdotes on the art of steal ing 
fingerprints. Class agrees that 
it is possible but highly unlikely 
that anyone would want to ''forge" 
Jim's fingerprints. 
Ron - O.K. Say they r eally 
Mitch 
Craig 
Wendy 
Stacy 
Ron 
Mitch 
Gail 
Mit.:h 
Ron 
Mitch 
Debbie 
were Jim's fingerprints. 
- Then Jim ' s guilty. 
- Just because J im's 
fingers are on the glass 
doesn't mean he couldn ' t 
have just handed the 
glass to Stacy. 
- ... Then 
- I didn 't do it, honest. I 
promise. I didn't even 
see the class. 
- Just make believe . 
- But Stacey's fingerprints 
are not on the glass. 
- How do you know? 
- (to ·her) Are they on t he 
glass? 
- No , I don't think so . 
- Then she wiped them off. 
- How could she just wipe off 
hers and not Jim' s? You 
can ' t do that. You can't 
even see the fingerprints 
to wipe them off. 
Beth - Bu t even if Jim' s finger-
prints are only on the 
glass, it still doesn't 
prove that Jim drank 
something else or he could 
have just held the glass. 
Ron - So, we haven't proven our 
case against Jim. But 
what can we say about 
Jim ' s fingerprints. Does 
that, the fin 0 e rprint~, 
count as evidence . 
Debbie - They ' re sort of evidence 
but they don't prove. 
Wendy 
Ron 
PAUSE 
Ron 
PAUSE 
Ron 
Holly 
Ron 
Shaun 
Ron 
Shaun 
Ron 
Shaun 
Ron 
- Proof gives you a 
guarantee. Evidence doesn't. 
- O.K. What does evidence do. 
- Well, if someone gives you 
a bunch of real good 
evidence ... I wish you 
liked Sherlock Holmes 
What do you do? 
- Do you believe them then? 
Sometimes. Sometimes I 
don't. No natter what the 
evide:1ce. 
~ That's int eresting. Let's 
get right back to that 
after we finish this . A 
lot of goo~ evidence may 
not cause you to believe 
but doesn't it give you 
some real ly good reasons 
for believing? 
- Yeah. 
- And a litt le ... some really 
"shaky" evi:::ence might just 
give ; ou a li tt le reason to 
believe. 
- But if it was really shaky , 
you wouldn't believe it. 
- Right, but if it was really 
shaky evidence, if it was 
evidence, couldn't that give 
you some, just a little 
reason to bel ieve. 
- Yes, but not enough to make 
you believe. 
- I see you and Holly want to 
do "belief" . O.K. But first 
we, you, said that proof 
gives a kind of guarantee of 
truth while evidence only 
gives us some reason to 
believe sonething is true. 
O.K. ~ow \,:-:st about belief. 
(Pause) ~hat is the 
relationship between evidence 
and belief. Can I believe 
something for which I have 
no evidence? 
Craig 
Jim 
Ron 
Craig 
Stacy 
Gail 
Craig 
Ron 
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- No . 
- Yes. Evidence is 
something which will make 
you believe something. 
- O.K . That's one point. 
But look at my question. 
Can I believe something 
for which I have no 
evidence. Jim says 
evidence makes you believe 
something. That's one 
point. I also want to 
know if you can believe 
without having evidence . 
- Evidence can help you 
have a belief but it can't 
make you believe. I can 
L,el.ieve anything I want 
to. I can believe with no 
evidence at all. I can 
believe that Jim drank 
from the glass ... 
- That's evidence. 
- His fingerprints are the 
evidence. 
- That's believing when I 
have evidence . But I couid 
also believe ... 
- That there are little 
invisible orange men that 
live on top of your head ... 
Craig - What? 
LAUGHTER 
Ron - I ' m trying to say, to 
help you with an example 
Craig - That doesn't help. 
LAUGHTER 
Ron 
Craig 
Hendy 
Gail 
- What I meant was you might 
want to say "I believe 
that there are little 
orange men living on top 
of my head even though I 
have no evidence for that 
claim." 
- Then I'd be crazy. 
- Unless you saw little 
orange footprints . 
- That would be evidence. 
TAPE RUNS OUT HERE: Conversation 
continues while new tape is inserted. 
Stacy - You could present all the 
PAUSE 
Shaun 
PAUSE 
Ron 
Jim 
Ron 
. . 
',. 
Ron 
PAUSE 
Jim 
Ron 
Beth 
evidence in the world and if 
I didn't want to believe it 
I just wouldn't believe it. 
- You mean you could believe 
I'm not here right now. 
- Aren't there two questions 
involved here. First, could 
Stacey or anyone else simply 
make-up their minds not to 
believe. Second , could 
S:acey or anybody simply not 
believe . 
- Sometimes there might be a 
lot of evidence that, say, 
your team lost the ball 
game but you still might not 
believe it. You might not 
believe that your team lost. 
- Is that what you mean or do 
you mean that you don't 
believe you should have lost. 
... l '1 
.) I 
.1.:.'- - Ln2 '-' -.~1~:" ...... """··' 
cheats? ... O.K. sometimes, 
yeah, you don ' t believe that 
you should have lost but ... 
and other times like you're 
thinking about the game and 
you believe that you really 
won. 
- What happens to the evidence 
here. 
- \.Jhat do you mean? 
- I take it you (1) your 
team really did lose · and 
(2) there are scorecards, 
reports from friends, e tc . a 
good deal of evidence to 
support the claim t hat your 
team lost. What happ <?ns to 
that evidence? 
- You can some times just 
ignore the evidence. 
Ron 
Beth 
Ron 
PAUSE 
Wendy 
PAUSE 
Ron 
Gail 
Ron 
SERIES 
Ron 
Wendy 
Ron 
Holly 
Ron 
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- Ignore it? 
- Yeah forget about it or 
say it ' s not good enough 
evidence. Like a mirage 
you could be in a desert 
and "see" a mirage and know 
you ' re in the desert and so 
not really believe what 
you are seeing . 
- Everybody understand that? 
That was pretty complicated. 
Do you understand that? 
Shaun? 
- You know there aren't real 
mirages. So when you 
think you see one, you don't 
really believe it. 
- Anybody ever see a mirage? 
- In the movies on T.V. 
- What about in person. 
OF NO'S 
- Say a guy came here and he 
looked just like George 
Washirigton, and he knew 
-~i "vrts of st:..::~'---,.-
Ge:orge 1\ashing: .:m , ::.i;,c .i.! 
said he was George 
Washington. Would you 
believe him? 
- No. 
- Why? 
- Because George Washington 
is dead. 
- So you reject one set of 
evidence statements ... I 
mean, you have on the one 
hand some evidence to 
support a belief that this 
guy is really George . 
Washington. He looks just 
like the picture, he says 
he is etc. On the othe r 
hand, yo u have h0ard chat 
(a) George Washington is 
dead and (b) eve n if h e was 
still alive, he would have 
to be over ~50 years old . 
INAUDIBLE 
Beth - They're both evidence. The 
first and the second one. But 
the second one, if you don't 
know is stranger. So you 
don't accept, you forget about 
the first. 
Ron - O.K . That ' s good. But now I ' m 
gett i ng mixed up. I feel like 
Harry. What is the relationship 
between evidence and belief. 
We sai d, I think, that 
evidence doesn't make you, 
doesn 't force you to believe. 
What does evidence do? 
Holly - It sort of he l ps you to believe. 
Like it says its 0.K. to 
believe something. 
Ron - Like a kind of support? Like 
the mo r e, the stronger the 
evidence, the greater the 
chance that you ' 11 be r_igh t 
in what you believe. 
Holly - Right. 
Ron - That seem right to everybody? 
vi:·"· -::-r 
... 4. •• ·1.. • - ........ 
,"l.vn l .:-u, ci :1 ,?u r. ry and connect 
some of the words that we've 
used together. 
GOES TO THE BOARD 
Ron - How about evidence. How does 
evidence relate to truth? 
Shaun - You can have evidence for 
something that is true and 
evidence for something that is 
false. 
Ron - So evidence can't guarantee 
truth . 
Shaun - Right. 
Ron - But the stronger the evidence , 
the gr eater t he likelihood 
of truth. 
Shaun - Yeah , but still no guarantee . 
Ron - What about belief. Does 
belief guarantee truth? 
PAUSE 
Ron - Can I believe something that 
is false'? 
Debbi<;! - Yes. 
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Ron - So belief does not 
guarantee truth. 
PAUSE 
Ron - Does it seem to you 
that one thing keeps 
leading to another? 
SERIES OF GROANS 
Ron - I ' m getting tired too. 
INAUDIBLE 
We'll stop now. But 
just think. about this 
for the next class. 
How does knowledge fit 
in with ail these other 
words. Does knowledge 
guarantee truth? Can 
I know tha t it ' s 
raining when it's not 
really raining. Also, 
could I know that it's 
rai ning (when its really 
raining) but not believe 
that its raining. 
ron - See you next week. 
